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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores how Niger can transform its security sector into an effective 
tool capable of fighting criminal and terrorist organizations that have threatened the 
country’s stability since the 1990s. The findings show that poor civil–military relations, a 
deficit of governance, and a lack of adequate coordination have hindered the 
transformation of the Nigerien security apparatus. Moreover, Nigerien security services 
are becoming increasingly overstretched. Relying on academic research, government and 
media reports, and the author’s personal experience, this thesis analyzes how Nigerien 
security services have adapted to evolving security challenges so far. The analysis 
identifies the reform successes that have contributed to stability in the security 
environment and the factors that have hindered previous reform efforts. It proposes that 
Niger should develop adequate mechanisms to prevent military from interfering in 
politics and to deter political actors from instrumentalizing the military for political gain. 
Furthermore, it is essential to promote good governance in the security sector through an 
effective oversight mechanism; to develop smart defense and security forces that are 
capable of operating effectively and efficiently; to craft a strategy that adapts to evolving 
threats; and to coordinate internal and external actions. Niger also requires the aid and 
expertise of its regional and international partners in achieving successful reform of its 
security sector. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, the Sahel region has been plagued by several 
sources of insecurity—particularly transnational organized crime and terrorism—as well 
as poverty, economic difficulties, and environmental-security issues associated with 
climate change that all have pushed certain people from the region to join these nefarious 
transnational networks.1 Regional insecurity—and consequently, instability—has 
worsened since the collapse of the Qaddafi dictatorship in Libya in 2011, which 
generated ungoverned spaces in the southern part of that country, while uncontrolled 
weapons and ammunition warehouses have fed arms-trafficking organizations in the 
region and boosted the operational capabilities of the terrorist groups.2  
The security forces in West African countries, including Niger, lack capable 
structures, equipment, and skills to combat—either singly or collectively—these security 
challenges, and remain dependent upon the presence of foreign troops in the region.3 In 
response, Niger has undertaken several reforms, which include increasing military 
expenditures and augmenting the number of military personnel. Nevertheless, several 
security governance-related obstacles have obstructed progress. Among these obstacles 
are the lack of strategic leadership in tackling these security threats, coupled with 
politicization of the chain of command and clan behavior (understood in terms of 
                                                 
1 The Sahel is a transition zone in Africa between the Sahara Desert to the north and the humid regions 
to the south. It includes Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea, Northern 
Nigeria, Northern Ethiopia, and Northern Somalia. Central Sahel countries, which are among the poorest in 
the world, have consistently ranked near the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) annual 
reports published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-
page/human-development-index-hdi. Terrorist groups include Al-Qaeda, which emerged after the end of 
the 1990s civil war in Algeria from various Algerian terrorist groups. Defeated on Algerian soil, the 
remaining cells of these terrorist groups retreated into northern Mali. 
2 Mali, for one, almost became a failed state after a military coup in 2012 arrested democratic progress 
and aggravated the spread of terrorist groups throughout the country. Ibrahima Dao, “Instability in Mali: 
Formulating Effective Responses to Insurgency, Terrorism, and Organized Crime” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2019), 15, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62776.  
3 Currently, U.S. troops and European troops including the 5,000 French troops of “Operation 
Barkhane” are indispensable in the Sahel countries’ fight against violent extremism groups and other 
transnational criminal organizations. 
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favoring small groups or political interests). The effect of Niger’s initiatives to improve 
its security services has been marginally positive in the sense that they have prevented the 
establishment of permanent terrorist bases within Nigerien territory but increasing threats 
along its borders recall the fragility of the security environment and the specter of 
destabilization. The successful attack of December 10, 2019, by the Islamic State in Great 
Sahara (ISGS) against Nigerien forces near the Malian border serves as a stark reminder 
of the difficulties Niger’s Armed Forces have experienced in unconventional warfare—
and their inability to properly deal with the new, multifaceted terrorist threats in the Sahel 
region.4  
Against this backdrop, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: 
How should Niger reform its security services in order to improve these institutions’ 
capacity to combat transnational security threats?  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The security threats posed by terrorist groups can be fatal to a country like Niger, 
which lacks capable security forces—much like the case of Mali prior to the 2012 coup. 
To avoid the fate of Niger’s neighbor Mali, the government or Niger should prioritize a 
comprehensive transformation of the security sector, aimed at developing capable forces. 
This thesis, thus, is relevant to policymakers in Niger—as well as in the Sahel and other 
regions in the world affected by similar security challenges—as it provides an overview 
of the main challenges to Niger’s national and regional security as well as a roadmap to 
reform the security sector. Elected and/or appointed officials facing such challenges may 
want to use this roadmap in their security sector reform endeavors.  
It is also relevant to the U.S. policymakers because the United States is engaged 
in the Sahel region alongside Sahelian countries to fight terrorist organizations, including 
the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP, also known as Boko Haram, ISGS, 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, 2020), 30, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-
Terrorism-2019-2.pdf. During this attack, which is the deadliest in country’s history, more than 70 soldiers 
were killed, and military equipment was looted by ISGS to reinforce its military capabilities.  
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and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These terrorist groups, which have 
evolved and gained traction in the region’s ungoverned spaces, constitute a threat to U.S. 
interests in Africa.5 For instance, in October 2017, four American and four Nigerien 
soldiers were killed by these terrorist groups in Niger in an attack known as the Tongo–
Tongo ambush.6 The Americans were members of a training team helping Nigerien 
forces in capacity building. The United States is thus concerned that the ungoverned 
spaces resulting from local security forces’ inability to control borders could make this 
Sahelian region a haven for terrorist groups.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review mostly centers on the differences between ideal security 
sector reform (SSR) programs and the weaknesses observed during the implementation of 
reform initiatives. This literature review considers the following themes: the purpose of 
SSR and its requirements, the challenges to security sector reforms, and catalysts for 
successful SSR. 
1. Security Sector Reform: Purpose and Role   
Scholars often agree that human security, development, and democracy tend to be 
the main objectives of SSR. In the eyes of Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri, for 
example, “the inability or inefficiency of a state in providing the basic security needs for 
its citizens poses a significant obstacle to stabilization and democratic consolidation.”7 In 
their view, people’s attention cannot be focused on stability and democracy when the 
state is unable to protect the people and their families, which in turn requires effective 
                                                 
5 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America (Washington, 
DC: White House, 2018), 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf. 
6 John Vandiver, “AFRICOM Investigates Images Depicting Niger Ambush that Killed Four U.S. 
Soldiers,” TCA Regional News, January 24, 2018, ProQuest. 
7 Hans Born and Philipp Fluri, “Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control and Reform of the 
Security Sector,” in Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies, ed. Hans Born, 
Marina Caparini, and Philipp Fluri (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, November 2000), 8. 
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and accountable security institutions.8 Ian Westerman agrees, and further points out: 
“Ensuring that there is a workable and sustainable security system in place, including a 
satisfactory and broadly democratic relationship between the legitimate government and 
the forces of the state, is the primary aim of SSR.”9 In this connection, Caparini and Fluri 
write that the promotion of democracy and stability requires a qualitative improvement of 
security services, and further argue that “[s]ecurity sector services must be effective and 
effectively managed because an army under democratic control, but without professional 
expertise, understanding and judgement, can be as dangerous to society as a rebelling 
army.”10 On the same note, for Adedeji Ebo and Kristiana Powell, “SSR contributes to 
the security of states and citizens, without which there can be no sustainable economic or 
political development.”11 Similarly, Mark Sedra, the co-founder of the Centre for 
Security Governance, notes that it is broadly recognized that security sector reforms 
constitute the foundation for curtailing instability and ensuring continuous progress in 
fragile states or states emerging from a struggle or from an authoritarian regime.12 In 
addition to these fundamental objectives, SSR can certainly play a major role in the 
consolidation of democracy. Indeed, it has been increasingly evident that new 
transnational threats constitute a major risk to newly democratic countries due to the 
weaknesses of their security institutions. According to Anthony Forster, there is a 
consensus among Western donors regarding the need for SSR in the countries where 
                                                 
8 Florina Cristiana Matei, “New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (London, 
England: Taylor & Francis Group, 2012), 48, ProQuest. 
9 Ian Westerman, “Too Much Western bias? The Need for a More Culturally Adaptable Approach to 
Post-conflict Security Sector Reform,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 3 (July 2017): 276–288, doi: 
10.1080/14751798.2017.1351602. 
10 Born and Fluri, “Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control and Reform of the Security 
Sector,” 104. 
11 Adedeji Ebo and Kristiana Powell, “Why Is SSR Important? A United Nations Perspective,” in the 
Future of Security Sector Reform, ed. Mark Sedra (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance 
Innovation [CIGI], 2010), 48. 
12 Mark Sedra, The Future of Security Sector Reform (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International 
Governance Innovation [CIGI], 2010), 16. 
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these donors intervene. These Western partners also agree that SSR is a high priority for 
governments and non-governmental actors in these recovering countries.13  
Scholars also discuss the preconditions—acceptable security environment and 
organized institutions—that the implementation of SSR requires. For example, Albrecht 
Schnabel and Hans Born claim that there are some basic elements necessary to undertake 
an SSR program, including  
the presence of an environment that is conducive to reform, characterised 
by an absence—or at least low levels—of violence; the availability of 
basic infrastructure and a working and favourable legal framework; the 
presence of solid, stable, and well organised domestic security and 
political institutions; low levels of corruption; and an active and informed 
civil society.14  
Particularly, in developing countries like Niger, corruption tends to be a significant 
impediment to the security sector. Sedra agrees and further stresses that the 
implementation of SSR requires also “the presence of a minimum level of security.”15  
By contrast, Schnabel and Born remark that “SSR tends to take place in highly 
volatile and unpredictable environments, far removed from the ideal conditions required 
for smooth implementation.”16 In other words, the implementation of SSR is more 
challenging in new democracies or post-conflict states. Countries undertaking SSR often 
experience an unstable security environment that presents itself as an obstacle to the 
reforms. Besides these local requirements most of the countries needing SSR programs 
are unable to undertake them by themselves because as Ebo and Powell note, “few 
                                                 
13 Anthony Forster, “West Looking East: Civil-Military Relations Policy Transfer in Central and 
Eastern Europe,” in Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies ed. Hans Born, 
Marina Caparini, and Philipp Fluri (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces, November 2000), 15. 
14 Albrecht Schnabel and Hans Born, Security Sector Reform: Narrowing the Gap between Theory 
and Practice (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 
2011), 19. 
15 Mark Sedra, “Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform,” in the Future of Security 
Sector, ed. Mark Sedra (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation [CIGI], 2010), 
106.  
16 Schnabel and Born, Security Sector Reform, 19. 
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countries—particularly those emerging from conflict—are in the position to undertake 
SSR without the strategic, technical and financial support of external partners.”17 Thus, 
the support of international donors is crucial in the SSR process.  
2. Challenges to Security Sector Reform 
Among the many challenges that nations may face when implementing SSR, 
several authors cite internal resistance as being the most severe. One school of thought 
posits that security-institution reform is challenged by the resistance of certain actors or 
the inability of the initiator to conduct the intended reforms due to local constraints 
related to the security environment or/and the shortage of necessary resources. In 
analyzing the “problems of planned social changes and resistance to change,” Kurt Lewin 
explains that certain groups are reluctant to change when proposed reforms interfere with 
their interests—for example the removal of a necessary unit for certain command when 
that unit is more useful elsewhere—brought by either internal or external 
contingencies.18 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) SSR Handbook concurs with 
Lewin’s findings and notes that the attitude of resisters is “logical and rational” because 
they defend their material, cultural, and political interests, such as keeping a dominant 
political party.19 Avigdor Levy reveals that, in the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire 
undertook many successive military reforms in which the main component of the army—
the Janissary corps—resisted the changes in the name of the preservation of its interests 
and privileges such as the preservation of the existing institutions’ funding.20 Similarly, 
during the 1990s in Russia, as Alexei Arbatov maintains, military reforms met internal 
                                                 
17 Ebo and Powell, “Why Is SSR Important? A United Nations Perspective,” 57. 
18 Kurt Lewin, “Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and Reality in Social Science; Social 
Equilibria and Social Change,” Human Relations 1, no. 1 (June 1947): 5–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/001872674700100103. 
19 OECD, OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice, 
(Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2007), 33, 
https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/478/3015/OECD%20DAC%20Handbook%20on%20SSR.pdf. 
20 Avigdor Levy, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the 
Eighteenth Century,” Middle Eastern Studies 18, no. 3 (July 1982): 244, www.jstor.org/stable/4282890. 
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opposition from the Russian military’s leadership who believed that these reforms would 
not result in a military force capable of facing North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) forces in a theaterwide conventional war.21 In the same vein, Stephen P. Rosen 
argues: “Military bureaucracies … are especially resistant to change” because of a deeply 
ingrained and routinized process in which officers enter in the army and follow the rules 
without expressing their own opinion until the existing ideas become solidly 
internalized.22 In sum, there is agreement among scholars that security institutions—in 
particular the armed forces—may resist reforms. 
Another group of scholars debates the concern posed by the lack of local 
ownership—perhaps the most common challenge to SSR. Indeed, Laurie Nathan argues 
that reforms cannot be successful if those who are undertaking them are not committed or 
lack a sense of appropriation.23 She argues, “A major problem in the area of security 
system reform in some regions, particularly in Africa, has been a lack of local input to 
and ownership of the emerging reform agenda.”24 Sedra has a similar view, arguing that 
a successful implementation of “the SSR model requires a radical change in the modus 
operandi of donor states in how they provide assistance, something they have been unable 
or indeed unwilling to embrace.”25 Sedra points out that the most frequent challenges to 
SSR are the lack of local ownership, the inadequacy of reforms to the local socio-political 
environment, and the scope of the reforms.26 These challenges should thus be taken into 
consideration as early as the planning phase of an SSR process.  
                                                 
21 Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,” 
International Security 22, no. 4 (1998): 83–134, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.4.83. 
22 Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, New York: 
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24 Nathan, No Ownership, No Commitment, 1. 
25 Sedra, The Future of Security Sector Reform, 17. 
26 Sedra, 27. 
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In addition, some scholars note the ambiguity around the concept of local 
ownership that excludes certain key local actors from the process. Eleanor Gordon argues 
that the deficiency of local ownership is “due to lack of clarity concerning who the locals 
are and what ownership [is].”27 Moreover, Willem Oosterveld and Renaud Galand 
highlight the difficulty in reconciling local and international norms. They argue that  
in the area of justice and security sector reform, the local ownership issue 
brings up a host of dilemmas that often prove to be very difficult if not 
impossible to balance out. One of these is the divide between local and 
international norms the issue being to what extent local norms can and 
should be amended to comply with international standards.28  
Similarly, Jane Chanaa raises the problem linked to donors’ concerns and interests that 
can hardly be taken into consideration without causing a prejudice to the holistic vision of 
the SSR.29  
Certain scholars highlight that even when local ownership is undertaken, 
challenges to SSR are still present due to the parties’ unwillingness to touch certain 
sensitive issues. Mara Kalin cites the limitations of the U.S. approach arising from 
Washington’s reluctance to interfere in sensitive issues of local armed forces.30 She 
believes that in most countries facing tremendous security challenges, “militaries may be 
structurally unsound and therefore require substantial and disruptive reforms. But they 
may lack the coherence and the will to undertake such reforms.”31 This style of reform, 
called “train-and-equip SSR approach,” is mostly used by the United States where the 
                                                 
27 Eleanor Gordon, “Security Sector Reform, Local Ownership and Community Engagement,” 
Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 3, no. 1 (August 2014): 1−18, 
https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.dx/?utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_
campaign=Stability_TrendMD_1. 
28 Willem Oosterveld and Renaud Galand, “Justice Reform, Security Sector Reform and Local 
Ownership,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 4, no. 1 (March 2012): 194–209, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000115. 
29 Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 55. 
30 Mara E. Karlin, Building Militaries in Fragile States: Challenges for the United States 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 4.  
31 Karlin, 4. 
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security environment is volatile and requires urgent stabilization. Nevertheless, this way 
of reform constitutes a dilemma. On the one hand, this approach can be useful because it 
mitigates internal opposition, which could be exacerbated when a donor country tries to 
touch on sensitive issues, making the whole project collapse. On the other hand, in most 
cases lacking a profound reform effort that affects all segments of the security apparatus, 
the outcome is generally a failure.32  
Schnabel also considers corruption as one of the impediments to successful 
security sector reform.33 He argues that corruption constitutes one of the major obstacles 
during the implementation of an SSR program.34  
3. Catalysts for Successful Security Sector Reform 
Two decades of experience in the field of SSR have forged the idea that among 
other things, having local actors participate fully in the process constitutes an 
indispensable element. For instance, Sedra argues that “there is a need to close the gap 
between the aims of the SSR model and the practical strategies required to drive change 
on the ground.”35 He posits that SSR processes are successful “when rooted with local 
perceptions of security and driven by local needs and visions of change.”36 Mobekk Eirin 
concurs with Sedra by arguing that “considerable experience has shown that unless there 
is local ownership of SSR processes, they will not succeed.”37 Similarly, Timothy 
Edmunds proffers that in order “to be successful, the actual practice of SSR must 
                                                 
32 Karlin, 3−6. 
33 Albrecht Schnabel, “Ideal Requirements versus Real Environments in Security Sector Reform,” 
Security Sector Reform,” in Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, ed. Hans Born and 
Albrecht Schnabel (Münster, Germany: LIT Verlag, 2009), 16. 
34 Schnabel, 16. 
35 Mark Sedra “Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a 
Second-Generation Model,” Journal of Intervention and State-building 12, no. 1 (February 2018): 48–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1426383. 
36 Sedra, “Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform,” 105. 
37 Eirin Mobekk, “Security Sector Reform and the Challenges of Ownership,” in The Future of 
Security Sector Reform, ed. Mark Sedra (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance 
Innovation [CIGI], 2010), 230.  
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disaggregate down to focused policy activities and organizational specificities that are 
sensitive to local context and flexible in the manner in which they are implemented.”38  
Timothy Edmunds agrees with other scholars when he emphasizes that the current 
problems of SSR “require a reorientation of the SSR agenda from one dominated by top-
down conceptual prescription to a more context-sensitive, bottom-up approach.”39 He 
remarks that “security sector reforms, [and] successful SSR promotion policies are often 
less about imposing models of best practice from outside, and more about thinking 
creatively of ways to engage with domestic circumstances to incentivize reformers—and 
indeed recidivists—to invest political capital in pushing through change.”40 Clearly, 
instead of imposing a model based on Western norms, Edmunds proposes to design a 
local-specific SSR concept that can fit with the local conditions of each particular case.41 
Sierra Leone is often cited as an example of successful implementation of SSR not least 
because most local imperatives have been taken into consideration.42 Matthew Ford 
notes that “Sierra Leone, as an example of successful Security Sector Reform, is the 
contemporary benchmark against which the historical assessments might be 
interpreted.”43 
Another group of scholars emphasizes the importance of identifying local actors 
and local conditions to avoid past mistakes related to the exclusion of some key actors in 
certain SSR processes. According to Eleanor Gordon, for example, a “substantive and 
inclusive local ownership of the SSR” is indispensable for the accountability of the 
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security and justice sector institutions and can increase “public trust” by responding to 
the security requirement of people.44 She also posits that local ownership should be 
holistically understood, “both in terms of who the locals are and what ownership 
constitutes.”45 For Eric Scheye, external actors should be able to identify the local 
conditions within which the SSR program is being implemented and to seize 
opportunities to provide support to local security-building initiatives even if the way 
these actions are being conducted does not respect strictly Western norms and 
practices.46 Therefore, as local ownership is crucial for the success of the SSR, 
Oosterveld and Galand suggest that internal and external actors should agree on “a 
common strategy and a coordinated implementation framework to ensure that local 
ownership is respected in a substantive way.”47 Alice Hills concurs when she writes, 
“The reform of security sectors must be understood in its domestic, as well as 
international, context.”48  
It is widely accepted among scholars in the security field that democratic civil-
military relations form a core element of the SSR process.49 Furthermore, there is a 
consensus on the requirement of a democratic control of legitimate civilian authorities 
over the military to have an effective security sector—i.e., provider of security to the 
state and its citizens. Arthur Larson writes, “Civilian control is a solution to the problem 
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of achieving responsibility in the military bureaucracy.”50 In sum, as Sedra argues, “The 
professionalism and effectiveness of the security sector is not just measured by the 
capacity of the security forces, but how well they are managed, monitored and held 
accountable [by the civilians who control it].”51 The main objective of governance in the 
defense and security field remains the building of a robust, coherent, and efficient 
security architecture dedicated to human security. Thus, Florina Cristiana Matei and 
Carolyn Halladay believe that civil-military relations should be taken a step further in 
order to accommodate the changing environment of democratic practices and the 
difficulties posed by the complex, ongoing security issues.52 This adaptation should be a 
fundamental aspect of forthcoming civil-military evolution. Sedra emphasizes that 
“developing more appropriate and effective approaches for SSR will help to contain the 
drift in the concept.”53  
The democratic civilian control of the military also requires the active and 
appropriate participation of the parliament in the process. For instance, Hans Born argues 
that “the security sector is no exception to the oversight powers of the parliament.”54 
Similarly, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Jürgen Rüland claim that “parliamentary oversight 
is a cornerstone of democratic control of the armed forces.”55 Citing the example of 
Indonesia, where there is no legislative committee for oversight, Matei and Halladay 
warn about the typical underdevelopment of these mechanisms of civilian control of the 
                                                 
50 Arthur Larson, “Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two 
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Military Relations,” Research (forthcoming). 
53 Sedra, “Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform,” 113. 
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military in new democracies.56 Manea and Rüland even argue that Indonesians have a 
narrow understanding of civilian control over militaries as they view “the separation of 
the military from politics, an apolitical, professional military force” as a foreign norm.57 
In attempting to address these issues, Matei and Halladay propose a conceptualization of 
“democratic civilian control in terms of authority over the following: institutional control 
mechanisms, oversight, the inculcation of professional norms, and efficiency.”58 For 
instance, service members should be trained to respect the rules of engagement, which 
should be crafted in accordance of international standards. Thus, parliament prevents the 
executive branch or military institutions from abusing people’s right to a comprehensive 
security architecture. 
More broadly, Schnabel and Ehrhardt write that “the overall aim of security sector 
reform is to enable states to ensure national defense and protect citizens within policy and 
budgetary constraints that are consistent with national development goals.”59 No matter 
how well the SSR is implemented, if in the end, the security sector is not able to deal with 
the identified security threats to citizens and state, the logical conclusion is that SSR has 
failed. Thus, the effectiveness of security forces in their roles and missions constitutes a 
fundamental element for a successful SSR program.60 In this connection, scholars 
generally agree on the importance of professionalism in the culture of effectiveness in 
military affairs.61 A professional security force accomplishes its duty according to 
instructions and with optimum resources. Matei and Halladay argue that “professionalism 
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factors into effectiveness, too, particularly in terms of military expertise and 
knowledge.”62 They justly note that “civilian control by itself does not lead ineluctably to 
good policy that culminates in military victories.”63 In this way, the military can play its 
role with professionalism and efficiency under clear and effective supervision by 
legitimate civilian authorities.  
The SSR literature tends also to suggest the inclusion of more aspects of civil 
society in the SSR processes.64 For instance, the involvement of civil society in the SSR 
processes has been proven crucial.65 This vital component of any vibrant democracy can 
have a positive impact on the overall process. Caparini notes that in Western democracies 
civil society influences governments’ actions through groups applying pressure and can 
provide expertise in security and defense issues.66 She adds that “civil society can play a 
role in helping the state to fulfill its responsibilities transparently and accountably.”67 
Sedra concurs with Caparini and highlights the crucial role of human rights groups, 
which provide a useful “external check on policy and action” of the security sector.68 
Furthermore, civil society organizations (CSO) have demonstrated their capacity to 
mobilize positive energies to support SSR processes. In the case of Liberia, Alexander 
Loden underscores the fact that “civil society has to some extent become a donor creation 
and a source of income for some Liberians.”69 The OECD/DAC Handbook mentions that 
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“the engagement of the civil society groups is often vital in fostering a supportive 
political environment through genuinely inclusive dialogue.”70 The Nigerien security 
sector needs the contribution of a vibrant civil society that can help create favorable 
conditions for such reforms.  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The approach to civil-military relations proposed by Matei and Halladay and the 
reorientation of the SSR process recommended by Edmunds are helpful to frame the 
issue. The goals for developing SSR in Niger are threefold: to fight the transnational 
threats, ensure human security for Nigerien citizens, and contribute to regional and 
international security. Thus, this thesis hypothesizes that the appropriate SSR program for 
Niger should create conditions in which civilian and military elites work closely to 
institutionalize democratically accountable, transparent, and effective security institutions 
composed of military forces, the police, and intelligence agencies. In this regard, while 
the contribution of donors is indispensable, the process requires the input of Nigerien 
security actors and civil society, as well as an appropriate oversight mechanism.  
To this end, this thesis posits three additional hypotheses. First, the military’s 
interventions in Niger’s politics have undermined the trust between civilians and military 
elites, while corruption and mismanagement of resources divert security services from 
their missions of providing security to the people and the state. Second, transforming 
Nigerien security services through an SSR process requires that local ownership be the 
cornerstone of the process. The country’s stability is still fragile as the threat is growing 
and the security forces are increasingly overstretched. Thus, the objective is to create 
conditions for long-term stability through an effective security apparatus trusted by 
citizens and capable of fighting current transnational threats. This objective cannot be 
achieved through the blind imposition of foreign norms and practices without a careful 
analysis of domestic constraints. Particularly, in Sahelian countries like Niger, where 
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there is a scarcity of resources and the linkage between transnational security threats, 
solutions should be more targeted and integrated at the regional level. 
Third, Niger still requires external support like the aid granted by the United 
States and other partners that can help Niger establish long-term capacity-building 
programs. This support from international partners, of which Ebo and Powell consider 
technical and financial resources particularly essential, can definitively enhance the 
capacity of the country to develop a coherent structure for security services under full 
democratic control and with good planning capabilities as well as the necessary fighting 
skills. While Niger should pursue a long-term process, however, external actors 
intervening in the region may have a short-term security agenda. If Niger does not take 
leadership of the process in designing and implementing the SSR project, the undertaking 
may lack local ownership and miss the main objectives. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis adopts a single case study (Niger) approach to provide insight into the 
SSR that may be most effective in building coherent security institutions capable of 
efficiently combating the transnational threats that Niger and other Sahelian countries are 
facing. This research project thus analyzes both theoretical studies and empirical cases on 
SSR to determine which aspects of previous reform efforts have been most effective and 
would serve to appropriately shape the Nigerien case. 
Secondary sources constitute most of the literature consulted to examine how SSR 
programs have been adequately implemented and maintained. Additionally, the reviewed 
scholarly works include primary sources on SSR, security governance, and personal 
experiences. The analysis of these sources gives an overview of the situation Niger is 
facing and will address the challenges as well as potential opportunities for achieving 
successful SSR. 
E. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This research study is built around five chapters. Chapter I is the introductory 
chapter. It presents the problem, the relevant literature, and hypotheses. Chapter II 
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addresses security challenges in Niger since the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya 
in 2011. From the historic perspective, Chapter III investigates the interventions of Niger 
Armed Forces in politics, how these interventions have shaped civil-military relations, 
and how they have affected the capabilities of Niger’s security services to combat 
multifaceted, transnational threats. Chapter III also focuses on the reforms that Niger has 
undertaken in the security sector. Specifically, it examines the internal initiatives—
adaptation of security services to the current instability—as well as external support 
provided by Western partners to enhance Nigerien security institutions. Chapter IV 
analyzes security reform in Niger and identifies the weaknesses and shortcomings that 
have hampered these reforms. Chapter V tests the hypotheses, presents the thesis 
findings, and provides recommendations to Nigerien policymakers for successfully 








II. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN NIGER 
Niger is located in a region with many ungoverned spaces and subject to intense 
geopolitical instability. This situation has given rise to internal and external security 
challenges. Domestically, security concerns arise due to conflicts among different 
communities who compete for sparse resources in vast ungoverned spaces and who have 
occasionally participated in rebellions or engaged in criminal and terrorist activities out 
of necessity. In the last three decades, for example, Niger has experienced two rebellions 
in its natural resource-rich northern reaches. Moreover, in the Sahel-Sahara region 
smuggling operations have largely replaced traditional trade—the historical caravan 
trade—as the main occupation for young adults. In addition to these internal security 
concerns, new transnational security challenges emerged in the 2000s and have worsened 
since 2011 with the proliferation of such terrorist groups as AQIM, ISGS, and Boko 
Haram. These internal and external threats all represent significant security challenges for 
Niger’s security forces. 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of Niger’s security challenges, both 
internal and external, from the time of French colonial rule to the present. The first 
section discusses internal security challenges linked to armed banditry, intercommunity 
violence, and rebellions. The second section focuses on the manner in which the 
insecurity and unrest in certain neighboring countries have resulted in direct terrorist 
attacks in Niger, as well as in exacerbating local vulnerabilities. Despite some courageous 
reforms to adapt the Nigerien security sector to asymmetric warfare, the country has 
struggled to deal effectively with these terrorist attacks. In these conditions of 
asymmetric engagement, terrorists generally use guerillas tactics with effectiveness. 
A. INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS 
Since its independence Niger has exhibited a historical pattern of insecurity in the 
northern parts of its territory that encompasses many ungoverned spaces where non-state 
actors have prospered for decades. While its geographical vulnerabilities allow the 
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proliferation of diverse illegal activities, certain members of its population that suffer 
from natural constraints revolt occasionally or engage in criminal and terrorist activities.  
1. Inherent Difficulties to Securing the Vast Nigerien Territory 
The immensity of the Nigerien territory, combined with harsh environmental 
conditions, have made the control of northern Niger difficult for Nigerien defense and 
security forces, which are limited in number. The Nigerien territory is about 490,000 
square miles (1,267,000 square kilometers), making it the largest country in West Africa. 
Two-thirds of this immense territory is desert and presents numerous ungoverned spaces. 
In fact, northern Niger is home to any number of spaces populated with only a small 
number of people because its desert areas are largely unsuited for human life and 
resources are scarce. It has become an ideal territory for criminal organizations and 
violent extremist groups.  
In certain Sahelian areas where the absence of the state is obvious, the 
competition for rare resources has often led to conflicts among farming and pastoralist 
communities. The conflicts stem from lack of resources including water and land.71 The 
Sahel region has suffered from a shortage of rainfall and water distribution for decades. 
Furthermore, the unpredictability of rainfall—likely caused by climate change—often 
results in floods.72 As a result, most agricultural lands have been eroded, while nomadic 
pastoralists have been in a desperate search for fertile pasture—resulting in a deadly 
competition between farmers and pastoralists for the same spaces.73 For instance, in 
November 2016 clashes between farmers and Fulani herders caused 18 deaths among 
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villagers in the northwest of the country.74 Nigerien authorities have faced difficulties—
incapacity to have military presence in vulnerable areas—in preventing these frequent 
clashes between farmers and pastoralists. In response, some communities have created 
their own self-defense groups to protect their interests. These armed groups have 
complicated the security equation for Nigerien authorities as these self-defense groups 
have often engaged in criminal activities.  
As in Mali, the general erosion of the rule of law and the perceived absence of the 
state, especially in the ungoverned spaces in the northern part of Niger, have created 
conditions in which people lack legal means to solve their differences and instead rely on 
non-state actors to provide order, justice, and other basic needs.75 Robert D. Lamb argues 
that “where the central government is weak or missing, another governing body tends to 
emerge to maintain order and deliver needed services.”76 Such terrorist groups as the 
Islamic State in Great Sahara have cultivated a propensity to fill this deficiency of state 
authority—often with Sharia Law—and certain communities seem to prefer the terrorists’ 
pseudo-justice to the state’s judicial systems, which are decried as corrupt.77 According 
to Pauline Le Roux, ISGS has widely exploited popular grievances and ethnic 
polarization to fuel friction among communities by exacerbating, for instance, tensions 
between Fulani herders and Tuareg nomads.78 This strategy of ISGS to exacerbate 
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conflicts among communities seems to work, as clashes between ethnic groups have 
become recurrent in the region.79 
2. Insurrectionary Movements in Niger’s History  
Another security concern in Niger has been recurrent Tuareg rebellions, which 
also took advantage of the numerous ungoverned spaces in northern Niger to challenge 
security forces. The successive revolts of the Tuareg community have to some extent 
been rooted in the Tuareg culture and in a sentiment of abandonment. The Tuaregs feel 
neglected because Niger’s central authority has not exercised effective control over 
territories inhabited by the Tuaregs.80 Additionally, Tubus—an ethnic group that 
straddles Libya, Niger, and Chad—occasionally joined Tuaregs in their revolt, as they 
have their own grievances that are similar to those of the Tuaregs regarding the way the 
central government has treated them.81  
Tuareg insurgencies started during the colonial period when France, once the 
dominant imperial power in the region, used military force to pacify the region. The 
Tuaregs resisted the colonization process of the Sahel-Sahara region, especially from 
1916 to 1917, when the chief of the Tuaregs, Ag Geda Kaocen (1880–1919), led a revolt 
against colonial rule.82 This Tuareg revolt ended in 1917, when Kaocen surrendered to 
the French officials.83 The event prompted the French colonial leadership in Niger to 
establish an administration that favored the promotion into offices of the skilled elite who 
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mostly originated from the southern part of Niger.84 This way of appointing 
administrators led to a further marginalization of Tuaregs, who continued their nomadic 
way of life and spent most of their time in the desert. Nevertheless, Kaocen’s resistance 
to French troops became a symbol and later inspired new generations in their fight 
against Niger’s central government.  
In light of this history, the Tuaregs sought to continue their way of life without 
observing the laws of the central government located in the country’s capital, Niamey, in 
the south. Delphine Perrin notes that “Tuaregs may consider themselves as 
geographically and culturally remote from the state on which they depend.”85 
Furthermore, when a French company (Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires 
[COGEMA]) started exploiting uranium—Niger’s first export product—in 1968, the 
resentment of the Tuaregs grew as they have not benefited from this resource, which is 
located in their area. Niger’s government and COGEMA create the Société Minière de 
l’Aïr (SOMAIR), of which the French group owns a 63.5-percent majority share, while 
Niger (Office National des Ressources Minières du Niger [ONAREM]) owns only a 
36.5-percent share.86 The Tuaregs expected to obtain benefits from the uranium mining 
industries, but the government, which was itself embroiled in economic and famine 
crises, could not make substantial efforts to satisfy Tuaregs’ demands of better living 
conditions.87  
These grievances formed fertile ground for the first rebellion in the history of an 
independent Niger, but the mismanagement of the return of the Tuareg refugees, who had 
earlier exiled themselves into neighboring countries, constituted the triggering event for 
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the rebellion. These nomadic populations, facing the harsh consequences of drought in 
Niger in the 1970s, lost most of their livestock and fled to Algeria and Libya. When the 
situation returned to normal in early 1990, the United Nations in collaboration with 
Nigerien, Libyan, and Algerian authorities initiated a process designed to help Tuaregs 
return to Niger.88 The first group of returnees (18,000 people) were kept in a camp 
located in the region of Tchin-Tabaraden for about three months in inadequate 
conditions. They did not receive the promised assistance, which was being diverted from 
its purpose by those who oversaw its distribution. As a result, young Tuaregs who 
returned from Libya protested and attacked government facilities on May 7, 1990.89 The 
retaliation following the attack on the Tchin-Tabaraden military camp by these young 
Tuareg protestors caused the loss of hundreds of lives.90 The frustration and anger 
experienced by the Tuaregs in their own country was unacceptable for these returnees. 
According to Carolyin Norris, these clashes ostensibly pushed Nigerien Tuaregs to 
launch an armed uprising in 1990.91  
Even though this Tuareg uprising lacked a clear political structure to convey 
intelligible demands, the unrest seemed to be motivated by the perceived marginalization 
of the Tuareg people.92 Despite the effort made by the military regime of Seyni 
Kountche (1974−1987) to promote the well-being of all Nigerien communities, the 
Tuaregs still felt marginalized and this apparently led to their revolt of the 1990s.93 The 
main demand formulated by Rhissa Ag Boula, commander in chief of the Front de 
Libération de l’Aïr et de l’Azaouad (FLAA), was the decentralization of the 
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administration to ensure the preservation of Tuareg interests.94 Yet, Nigerien historian 
Mamoudou Djibo argues that all Nigerien regions have suffered from the same 
socioeconomic difficulties such as the lack of suitable schools and hospitals.95 In fact, as 
Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world, it has been difficult for the successive 
Nigerien governments to adequately provide basic public services for people.96 The 
socioeconomic conditions of the Tuaregs therefore did not improve as expected and their 
grievances remained unaddressed. 
This first Tuareg rebellion of the independence era was characterized by its lack 
of unity. This heterogeneous movement was composed of numerous small armed groups 
representing distinct clans.97 The main Tuareg groups were the FLAA led by Rhissa 
Boula, the Front de Libération Temoust (FLT) led by Mohamed Akotey, the Front 
Populaire de Libération du Sahara (FPLS) led by Mohamed Anacko, and the Front 
d’Action Révolutionnaire (FAR), led by Slimane Hyar. These Tuareg groups were under 
the umbrella of the Coordination of Armed Resistance (CRA).98 In addition to the armed 
Tuareg groups, two other groups claimed to defend the interests of the Tubus, an ethnic 
group located in the northeast of the country.99 Tubus created two fronts: the Forces 
Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara (FARS) and the Front Démocratique 
Révolutionnaire (FDR). While FARS was aligned with Tuareg fronts, FDR tried to be 
independent in the conduct of its revolt against the government of Niamey. The 
fragmentation of this rebellion into numerous subgroups created a volatile security 
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environment with many localized clashes between rebels and government forces. 
Nigerien security forces have encountered difficulties in handling these widely dispersed 
clashes across northern Niger. Moreover, the competing armed groups, which have 
different aims and agendas, were not able to present a coherent and unified political 
demand to the government.  
In this unstable period of transition to democracy in the early 1990s marked by 
numerous social protests, the rebellions generated violence and weakened the fragile 
economy of the northern part of the country, which was based on tourism. The violence, 
which started with attacks against police stations, became a low-intensity insurrection 
involving Nigerien security forces and rebel groups. Rebels retreated into the northern 
mountainous areas and attacked government forces—gendarmerie brigades and isolated 
army units, which were not well defended and constituted the favorite targets—and 
occasionally civilian buses. Lawel Chékou Koré observes that rebels used their mastery 
of the terrain to move faster and gain the advantage of surprise over government forces 
and to ensure their attacks were highly effective.100  The transitional government and the 
subsequent democratic government struggled to provide a strong military response to the 
insurrection due to their limited resources and the difficult working conditions of the 
armed forces.  
On April 24, 1995, a peace agreement was signed—the main components of 
which were the establishment of a decentralized system of administration, the 
securitization of conflict-affected areas, the strengthening of elite Tuareg representation 
in public administration, and the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants.101 
In November 1997, the second Tubu front (FARS) and the Tuareg fronts, which were not 
part of the peace agreement of 1995, signed additional peace accords in Algeria. FDR 
signed a separate accord on August 21, 1998, in Chad.102 Peace prevailed but many 
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people were displaced, and the economy was devastated, generating the impetus for new 
turmoil.  
Since then, the government has implemented several policies to conform to the 
accord, but poverty has increased at the same time, creating new challenges for young 
people. Following the peace agreement of 1995 many former combatants were integrated 
into the Nigerien security forces and the administration, and the process of decentralizing 
the administration started in 2004, but other demands such as an equitable share of 
resources remained unsatisfied.103 This latter point constituted a concern for the Tuareg 
leaders because, as Jeremy Keenan argues, “The Niger rebellion is rooted in this growing 
resentment at the rapacious exploitation of their lands and their exclusion from its 
benefits.”104  
Despite the efforts of the government to satisfy the requirements of the 1995 
peace agreement, a new rebellion, the Mouvement Nigérien pour la Justice (MNJ), broke 
out in 2007 with the attack on the village of Iferouane on February 8, 2007.105 The 
Nigerien government of the time led by president Mamadou Tanja refused any 
negotiations and deemed these rebels armed bandits.106 The government’s stance was 
motivated by the fact that the peace process was ongoing, and thus, from Mamadou’s 
perspective, there was no reason to engage in additional talks. Moreover, the government 
considered the new demands—such as the creation of a specific General Staff with 
autonomous command to oversee security and defense issues in the three regions of Aïr, 
Azawak, and Kawar—unreasonable.107 Consequently, a new campaign of violence 
escalated in northern Niger. In 2009, the Nigerien security forces defeated this revolt and 
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rebels agreed to cease hostilities after mediation took place in Libya. The government 
took into consideration the grievances raised, and a real integration process of the 
Tuaregs started. Currently, the Tuareg community is more integrated in the Nigerien 
socioeconomic sphere and in the armed forces, too. This new relationship between 
Tuaregs and the Nigerien government probably helped to prevent the entrenchment of 
terrorists in the northern Niger. 
3. Increasing Criminal Activities in Northern Niger 
The northern part of the Nigerien territory has faced a proliferation of organized 
criminal activities that has been exacerbated by the outbreak of Tuareg insurgencies in 
northern Mali and Niger in the 1990s. Many former combatants who failed to socially 
reintegrate have re-engaged in lucrative criminal activities. The regional actors of 
organized criminal networks mainly focus their activities on the smuggling of illegal 
arms, illicit drugs, and cigarettes, as well as human trafficking. The illegal spread of light 
weapons and small arms constitutes a major concern for Nigerien authorities as the illegal 
circulation of these arms increases criminal activities as well as inter-community and 
intra-community violence. Lacher Wolfram, writing about the situation in this part of 
Africa in 2012, argues that “conflicts in Algeria, northern Niger, and Mali turned the 
region into a major arms trafficking hub.”108 He further highlights the vital contribution 
of cigarette smuggling in generating networks that have allowed drug trafficking to 
flourish.109 Undeniably, this transnational trafficking—first of contraband cigarettes and 
later of illicit drugs—has quickly become an important source of revenue for rising 
violent extremist organizations.  
Similarly, human trafficking has become a tragedy in the Sahel region. The 
security vacuum in Libya has created incentives for migrants from sub-Saharan countries 
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to travel through Niger to reach Europe via Libya.110 Thus, the criminal economy around 
human trafficking has prospered in northern Niger, and an increasing number of young 
sub-Saharan Africans have engaged in this perilous enterprise. These migrants have often 
lost their lives when the smugglers left them in the desert without any chance of survival. 
Nigerien security forces have often rescued abandoned migrants but sometimes they 
could not save them. For instance, in 2013 the bodies of 92 migrants were found in the 
Sahara Desert.111  The increasingly restrictive measures, such as new laws against 
human trafficking and an increase in patrols, have reduced the number of migrants 
traveling via Niger.112  
At the same time, the government’s initiatives can have an adverse effect on the 
stability of the region. The restrictions on migrants’ movements have disrupted the 
economic system related to human trafficking. In Agadez and Dirkou, for example, this 
disruption of the local economic system may have pushed many former smugglers to join 
other criminal networks and terrorist groups.113 The research fellow at the Clingendael 
Conflict Research Unit Fransje Molenaar argues, “The reality on the ground is that 
migration and other types of illicit cross-border trade sustain and contribute to people’s 
livelihoods.”114 According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 
main occupation of about 60 percent of young people (18 to 25 years old) has been the 
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migrant transportation business in Dirkou, the main relay city in the northeast of 
Niger.115 Lack of opportunity has made these people vulnerable targets for drug 
traffickers and terrorists. 
B. CURRENT EXTERNAL SECURITY THREATS  
Niger is surrounded by countries with serious security problems of their own—
most notably Mali, Nigeria, and Libya, as illustrated in Figure 1, and these problems have 
spilled over into the neighboring countries.  
 
 Terrorist groups’ operation zones in the Sahel and Lake Chad.116 
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In these countries, ungoverned spaces and their permeable borders create 
permissive conditions for criminal and terrorist activities. As Wolfram argues, “The 
importance of organized criminal activity in the Sahel-Sahara region stems from the fact 
that there are few alternative activities that produce similar profits and rapid 
enrichment.”117 In fact, in the weak Sahelian states like Niger, Mali, and Chad, the 
capacities of law reinforcement in certain parts of their territories are nonexistent. Thus, 
the scale of transnational threats that have deeply threatened Niger’s stability has become 
critical. This section analyzes how the security challenges of Niger’s neighbors affect 
Niger’s security landscape. These impacts have taken the form of direct attacks against 
security forces and civilians that have effectively worsened living conditions by 
hindering socioeconomic activities. Farmers are targeted in their farms and merchants 
during their return from marketplaces.  
1. Growing Transnational Security Challenges 
Sahelian countries like Niger with large ungoverned spaces have faced 
tremendous challenges due to various transnational security threats that have made the 
region one of the world’s most dangerous areas. The connection between criminal and 
terrorist activities has made the Sahelian security equation more complex and difficult to 
manage with conventional security tools. While pursuing different objectives, violent 
extremist movements and organized criminal networks have reinforced each other for 
decades.118 Terrorist groups often ensure the safe transport of drugs, and the resources 
they obtain from this activity are used to purchase arms and ammunition that traffickers 
have made available in every corner of the Sahel region.119 Moreover, the transnational 
dimension of the jihadists’ threat in Sahel and Lake Chad has become evident for 
regional security actors. When analyzing the case of terrorism in the Lake Chad region, 
Usman A. Tar and Mustapha Mala found that “the transnationalization of these jihadist 
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movements is located within historical and geographical contexts.”120 Also, the 
involvement of terrorist organizations in such transnational criminal activities as the 
abduction of foreign nationals to extort ransoms has been a key element of their 
ascension. According to Jean Charles Brisard, “AQIM is raising annually more than 
$17M from the K&R (kidnapping and ransom) business.”121 The wealth pulled from 
these activities has been converted into military capabilities and means of influence over 
local populations.  
In parallel, while the destabilizing impact of transnational threats is growing in 
Niger as they are across the entire Sahelian region, the structural causes of their 
expansion remain unaddressed. Long-term poverty and lack of opportunity continue to 
increase and push some young people to find illegal alternatives for income to alleviate 
their desperate living conditions. The situation in Niger is a reflection of the entire 
Sahelian condition. Nicolò Sartori and Daniele Fattibene of the Italian Institute of 
International Affairs write, “Weak economic performances and high levels of poverty, 
along with explosive demographic trends—60% of the population is under 25, most non-
educated, unemployed and excluded from basic socioeconomic dynamic—make fertile 
ground for disenfranchisement, grievance and radicalization across the region.”122 The 
depressed socioeconomic situation makes controlling the security situation nearly 
impossible. The transformation of violent extremist organizations into a strong, 
coordinated terrorist force in the last few years appears to have confirmed this 
assumption. 
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2. Security Vacuum in Libya 
The destabilization of Libya in 2011 following the fall of Muhammar Al-
Gaddafi’s regime was the catalyst of the instability in the Sahel, a region already battered 
by recurrent rebellions and criminal activities. First, in 2012, Tuaregs who had been 
trained in the Libyan Islamic legion returned from Libya to Mali and Niger, which 
created a sudden surge of insecurity. In fact, these Tuaregs, who had solid military 
training, returned with various weapons and military equipment and, in the case of Mali, 
refused to disarm. As Yehudit Ronen mentions: “Many Tuaregs fled the chaos of post-
Qaddafi’s Libya and returned to their native countries, disrupting the sensitive ethnic and 
political balances in the Sahel belt.”123  
Second, the uncontrolled Libyan arms warehouses fueled the regional arms traffic 
and enhanced the military capabilities of terrorist groups in the Sahel and the Lake Chad 
regions.124 The transfer of arms and ammunition from Libya to Sahel started 
immediately after Gaddafi’s forces lost the control of the southern regions. For instance, 
on June 12, 2011, Nigerien security forces patrolling the country’s northern border 
captured about 640 kilograms of military plastic explosive (Semtex) and detonators, 
which were part of unguarded Libyan arsenals.125 The estimation revealed that a total of 
more than one million tons of Libyan weapons were illegally transferred in the region.126 
The Sahelian Al Qaeda affiliates that had found refuge in the northern Mali since the end 
of the civil war in Algeria and the Tuareg secessionists seized the opportunity presented 
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by abundant illegal weapons in circulation in the region to reinforce their military 
capabilities.127 
Third, the Libyan civil war in 2011 destroyed Libyan state structure and therefore 
created a security vacuum in large parts of the country and, by extension, a security threat 
to Niger. The southern part of Libya, which includes the border with Niger, has become a 
haven for armed groups and criminal organizations. Since the outbreak of the civil war, 
southern Libya has been characterized by the absence of any form of government 
authority. As shown in Figure 2, neither of the two competing centers of power in 
Libya—the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj nor 
Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar—exerts any real 
territorial control over the southern Libyan region occupied by various militias.  
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 Areas of control in Libya’s Civil War.128 
This situation has allowed illegal activities to flourish and has made the region an 
environment conducive for violent extremist activities. The three main ethnic groups 
(Tubus, Tuaregs, and Arabs), all of which have their own militias, have exerted control 
over certain portions of the southern territories and have conducted smuggling activities 
between these Libyan territories and the Sahel in an organized manner.129 Moreover, 
these criminal and terrorist groups have strong links with the local social fabric: terrorists 
often get married to locals and provide them basic goods.130 AQIM and other terrorist 
groups use southern Libya as a logistics hub, a criminal marketplace where they can carry 
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out all kinds of activities that enhance their core interest of destabilizing Sahelian 
countries.131  
The incapacity of Libyan political actors to peacefully settle the ongoing political 
crisis is an obstacle to the resolution of the instability that has been hurting Sahelian 
countries. Libya has become a geopolitical battleground in which great powers act to 
preserve their divergent interests, generating more tensions among Libyans and thus 
undermining the prospect of peaceful resolution of the crisis.132 Such direct foreign 
interventions as the aid Turkey has been providing to GNA or the deployment of Russian 
mercenaries in support to Haftar’s forces have made Libyan unrest more complex and 
difficult to solve.133 So long as the main power centers continue to fight each other, 
southern Libya will remain under the control of non-state actors and thus a base from 
which these actors can destabilize the Sahel. This deteriorating security situation in the 
entire Sahel will inevitably continue to alter the security environment in Niger unless the 
country finds a way to mitigate the effects of the Libyan crisis as Tunisia and Algeria did.  
3. Uncertainty in the Lake Chad Region 
The Lake Chad region is characterized by many ungoverned spaces from which 
terrorist organizations and criminal networks have been operating for a long time. As 
shown in Figure 3, it is composed of hundreds of islands where the four counties that 
have territories in this area—Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—do not exercise 
control. 
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 Boko Haram’s areas of operation.134  
During the rainy season, the swampy areas of the lake are almost inaccessible to 
security forces and other state tools of sovereignty. Hence, these ungoverned spaces in 
the region have been a refuge for terrorist organizations and criminal networks that pose a 
threat to regional security. As a result, the threat emanating from these areas has 
jeopardized Niger’s security as well as regional stability. Boko Haram is indisputably the 
main terrorist group that has taken advantage of the permissive conditions offered by 
ungoverned spaces in the Lake Chad region.  
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Since the 1990s, this area has been known for widespread armed banditry, and in 
the 2000s, this persistent insecurity reached a new and notable high with the rise of 
fundamentalist extremism in the region. In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf, a Nigerian Muslim 
leader, founded the militant Islamist group Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad 
(JAS) [“People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”]. 
The organization is commonly known as Boko Haram, which means “Western education 
is forbidden” in the regional language, Hausa.135 In 2009 Nigerian security forces 
conducted a harsh military campaign against Boko Haram and killed most of its 
members, including the leader of the group, Mohammed Yusuf.136 The remaining 
members led by Abubakr Sekau fled Nigeria for North Africa and Somalia to join 
experienced terrorist groups (AQIM and Al Shabab) for training.137 Almost destroyed in 
2009, the group rebuilt itself by recruiting massively in local communities and by 
purchasing new resources and arms from its external backers. In 2010, the return to 
Nigeria of the remaining members, along with foreign fighters, signaled the beginning of 
large-scale attacks and a reign of terror. Boko Haram started using sophisticated arms and 
tactics such as suicide bombings during its attacks.138 On Christmas Eve 2010, Boko 
Haram used seven improvised explosive devices (IED) to target Christian communities in 
Jos, Plateau State in Nigeria. This attack caused the death of 80 people and many others 
were injured.139 Subsequently, it became one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups 
and a major concern for regional stability.  
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Boko Haram has likewise become a pressing problem for Niger, especially since 
the terrorist group began conducting direct attacks on Niger in 2014. Before then, Boko 
Haram used Niger for supply and recruitment of new combatants who joined the group in 
large numbers due to the attractive financial benefits offered to them. Later, fighters 
started crossing the border to conduct direct attacks on Nigerien territory. The first attack 
of Boko Haram in Niger was on May 14, 2014, against a Nigerien military patrol in the 
Diffa region. Three members of the group were arrested during this attack.140 Boko 
Haram’s aggression against Nigerien interests reached its highest level in April 2015 
when it attacked  Nigeriens on Karamga Island, killing 74 people, including 28 civilians.  
After a decline in violence in 2015 and 2016, the Lake Chad region faced another 
surge in Boko Haram’s attacks in August 2016, which coincided with the organization’s 
split. The incoherence between Boko Haram’s ideological claim and the targeting 
strategy promoted by its leader Abubakr Shekau—systematic violence against civilians—
led to its fractionalization.141 In fact, certain leaders of the group such as Abu Musab Al 
Barnawi disapproved of unnecessary violence against civilians. Al Barnawi believed that 
their fight should not be against innocent populations but against “true infidels,” which 
Al Barnawi maintained were the governments of the Lake Chad region and Western 
interests.142 According to Jacob Shapiro, this divergence among Boko Haram’s 
leadership “refers to differences in induced preferences, [which] often occurs in terrorist 
organizations.”143 As the view of Al Barnawi is aligned with the ideology of ISIS, Abu 
                                                 
140 Freedom C. Onuola, A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and 
Regional Responses (Abuja, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, November 2014), 7. 
141 Omar S. Mahmood and Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Factional Dynamics within Boko Harar (Dakar, 
Senegal: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), July 2018), 19. 
142 Mahmood and Ani, 13. 
143 Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma. Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013), 29. 
40 
 
Bakr al-Baghdadi named him the head of Boko Haram, and this change of leadership led 
to the split of the group when Shekau rejected the nomination of Al Barnawi.144 
The faction ISWAP, led by Abu Musab Al Barnawi, has significantly increased 
its lethality, and represents the principal threat to stability in the eastern part of Niger. 
Indeed, while operating in all four countries of the Lake Chad region, ISWAP has 
demonstrated a strong capacity to increase violent attacks. In fact, violent events linked to 
ISWAP increased from 27 in 2017 to 83 in 2018.145 ISWAP’s behavior conforms with 
the argument of Audrey Cronin Kurth, who writes: “Splinter groups are often more 
violent than the ‘mother’ organization, as they respond to the imperative to demonstrate 
their existence and signal their dissent.”146 Additionally, ISWAP constitutes an 
immediate danger for Nigerien stability due to its strategic approach to civilian 
populations. ISWAP is concerned about gaining support from local people. Moreover, the 
geographic distribution of attacks, as shown in Figure 4, indicates that most of the attacks 
against Nigerien interests were conducted by ISWAP. 
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 Terrorist attacks in the Lake Chad Basin.147 
Finally, the complexity and the coordination of ISWAP’s attacks suggest that it is capable 
of launching more effective attacks than JAS.  
Another aspect of the regional security landscape that threatens Nigerien stability 
is the burden of refugees. Since the outbreak of the security unrest in the northeast of 
Nigeria in 2009, hundreds of thousands of people have fled from Nigeria into the 
Nigerien region of Diffa, generating a humanitarian crisis in an area already hindered by 
conflict.148 Internally displaced persons and Nigerian refugees numbered about 281,000 
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in Diffa region.149 JAS and ISWA have often conducted raids on the refugees’ camp to 
abduct young boys who are then forced to become child soldiers.  
4. Complex Security Challenges in Northern Mali 
Since the seizure of northern Mali by a coalition of rebels and jihadists in 2012, 
the security environment in the northern part of Mali has increasingly become worse. In 
January 2012, supported by its Islamist militant ally Ansar Dine [Defenders of the 
Religion], the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azaouad (MNLA) launched a 
military campaign to capture the northern part of Mali.150 French military intervention in 
January 2013 prevented any further advance of these movements toward the south and 
freed the main towns of the north, but the terrorist groups dispersed into the desert and 
MNLA occupied Kidal.151 While AQIM, which emerged from the Algerian civil war of 
the 1990s, has been the major transnational non-state actor that has threatened the region 
for more than two decades, many others groups—such as the Mouvement Pour 
l’unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) [the Movement for Unity and 
Jihad in West Africa], the front de libération du Macina (FLM) [Macina Liberation 
Front], Al Mourabitoun led by Mocktar Bel Moctar, and Ansaroul Islam led by Malam 
Ibrahim Dicko—have coalesced to create a complex terrorist network unfortunately 
linked to MNLA rebels.152 Later, the divergence among AQIM’s leadership over 
ideology gave rise to a dissident group: the Islamic State in Great Sahara (ISGS) led by 
Adnan Abu Walid Al Sahrawi. After ISGS broke away, AQIM and other groups aligned 
with the ideology of Al Qaeda and united to create Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal 
Muslimeen (JNIM) [The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims] in 2017.  
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The reorganization of the terrorist network in the Sahel coincided with a 
significant increase of violent events in the region. According to Le Roux, “the Sahel has 
experienced the most rapid increase in militant Islamist group activity of any region in 
Africa in recent years.”153 Her report notes that “the number of reported violent events 
linked to militant Islamist groups activity in the Sahel has been doubling every year since 
2016.”154 The events of 2019 confirmed this trend, citing 800 violent extremist 
attacks.155 The attacks conducted by ISGS alone grew from 50 in 2017 to 205 in 2019, 
while those committed by AQIM and its affiliates rose from 144 in 2017 to 595 in 
2019.156  These figures show a willingness of both factions to engage in more and more 
violent activities. Though both ISGS and AQIM have increased their attacks significantly 
during this period, AQIM and its affiliates claim more total attacks.  
In any event, ISGS, which has been responsible for most of the attacks against 
Nigerien interests since 2016, has represented the most serious security challenge to 
Niger. According to the distribution of the attacks, as shown in Figure 5, this terrorist 
group has conducted nearly all attacks in Niger.  
                                                 
153 Le Roux, “Responding to the Rise in Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” 1–8. 
154 Le Roux. 
155 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, 
Diversifying,” January 18, 2020, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/threat-from-african-militant-islamist-
groups-expanding-diversifying/. 
156 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Progress and Setbacks in the Fight against African Militant 




 Attacks by terrorist groups in the Sahel in 2019.157 
In fact, ISGS has succeeded where AQIM has failed in Niger: exploiting local grievances 
against the Nigerien government. It has successfully convinced the Fulani community 
dispersed in this area that the enemy is not the Tuaregs who used to threaten their villages 
but the states of Mali and Niger, which fail to protect them.158 As a result, hundreds of 
Fulani youth have been radicalized and have joined terrorist groups in masses.  
The scale and sophistication of attacks conducted by this terrorist group have been 
growing while spreading all over the region. These complex attacks have coincided with 
the decline of the Islamic State in the Middle East. The complexity of these attacks 
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suggests that some of ISIS’s experienced foreign fighters from Maghreb and West Africa 
may have returned and joined the Sahelian theater to seek new fighting zones. As Martha 
Crenshaw observes, “Experienced foreign fighters sometimes return home to commit acts 
of terrorism.”159 As Algerian and Tunisian returnees can hardly return to their home 
countries due to the effective counterterrorism measures, the safe haven for them seems 
to be the Sahelian region where countries still struggle to implement successful 
counterterrorism measures. The complexity of these attacks indicates that Sahelian 
terrorist groups have grown in experience and have learned more planning skills, and 
hence, will constitute a major challenge in the future.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Since the outbreak of the Tuareg insurgencies in northern Niger during the 1990s, 
the country has faced recurring internal security challenges largely enabled by the 
numerous ungoverned spaces in this region. The crises in Libya, Nigeria, and Mali have 
exacerbated internal security threats and represent a direct security concern for Niger. 
While these conflicts surrounding Niger have fueled internal criminal networks through 
drug, arms, and human trafficking, the direct attacks from neighboring countries against 
Nigerien interests have become more frequent and increasingly lethal. The Nigerien 
security sector has maintained only a fragile stability by mobilizing internal capacity and 
maintaining a fruitful cooperation with regional and international partners. Nevertheless, 
since 2016, the intensity and the frequency of attacks against Niger have overstretched 
Nigerien security forces. This evolving security situation continues to threaten the 
stability of the country and constitutes a major challenge for the Nigerien security sector.  
  
                                                 









III. NIGERIEN SECURITY SERVICES  
Niger has avoided the security turmoil that its neighbor Mali has experienced 
since 2012, in no small part thanks to the efforts of the Nigerien security services. These 
forces—the Nigerien Armed Forces, National Gendarmerie, National Guard, National 
Police, and intelligence services—have significantly contributed to the Niger’s ability to 
face complex security challenges leading some external observers to consider the 
Nigerien security services superior to those of Mali and Burkina Faso.160  
These Nigerien security services, which have faced internal and external security 
threats, represent the result of six decades of transformation. The various reforms 
undertaken at different periods of the Nigerien history reflects the complexity of civil-
military relations and the manner in which the political sphere and the military have 
influenced each other. This chapter gives a historical overview of the Nigerien security 
services and highlights the key elements of their transformation that can explain their 
current condition. 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE NIGERIEN SECURITY SERVICES 
Like in other francophone African countries, the Nigerien security services that 
emerged from the colonial period were heavily influenced by the manner in which the 
French used the military to rule its colonies. The newly independent Nigerien security 
services retained the widespread coercive methods previously employed by the French 
colonial administration. They also inherited the bad behavior of the “Senegalese 
tirailleurs”—West African infantrymen serving in French military before 
independence—which was often at odds with Nigerien traditional values and customs. 
Additionally, unlike in former British colonies, France maintained strong ties with its 
former colonies and continued to influence security matters in these countries long after 
independence. 
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1. Colonial Legacy  
The way the French conquered and administered their West African colonies from 
the 1890s to 1960—through the extensive use of military forces and methods—deeply 
influenced the security forces that emerged after the independence of these colonies. The 
Nigerien security services that emerged in the 1960s inherited many characteristics of the 
French colonial establishments that hindered the emergence of the Nigerien defense and 
security forces, which include the Forces Armées Nationales (National Armed Forces), 
and Police Nationale (National Police), as independent and effective institutions with 
adequate capacity to perform their duty and to maintain satisfactory relations with the 
population. 
Nigerien forces also inherited the colonial power’s penchant for maintaining order 
in a way that was repressive to the people they were supposed to protect.161 During the 
colonial era, individuals faced severe punishment for even the slightest offenses.162 
Furthermore, the introduction of forced labor in the 1900s brought another form of abuse 
that traumatized Nigerien civilians.163 At this time, forced labor was used to construct 
most of the infrastructure such as roads and bridges. French recruiters entered villages 
randomly and forcibly selected nearly all male adults for conscripted labor, which was 
considered mandatory military service.164 French colonial security services supervised 
this forced labor, which became a general practice in all French colonies in Africa until 
1946.165 Idrissa Kimba, a researcher on political and social history of contemporary 
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Niger, remarks that “military service was not accepted anywhere with enthusiasm.”166 
French military repression also occurred through forcible tax collection. For instance, 
despite serious droughts and famines in western Niger from 1911 to 1914, people were 
forced to pay colonial taxes.167  
The main legacy of the colonial era is the prominent presence of French military 
in Nigerien post-colonial security forces that had been a cause of friction between the 
French military and their Nigerien equivalents.168 The use of “Senegalese tirailleurs” by 
the French leadership in the military campaign against Nigerien pre-colonial authorities 
and the retention of these tirailleurs as the intermediary between the colonized and the 
colonizers left little opportunity to promote Nigerien military elites within colonial 
security forces.169 Like in other African armies Niger lacked a significant number of 
Nigerien officers when independence occurred in the 1960s.170 As a result, when Niger 
created its armed forces after its independence on August 3, 1960, it had few officers and 
non-commissioned officers (NCO) who could be in charge of the security services. 
Therefore, Nigerien authorities filled most of the leadership positions of these security 
services by hiring French officers and NCOs during the decade following 
independence.171 As a result, even though Niger got its independence, its armed forces 
remained under the influence of the former colonial power. The lingering influence of the 
French military in the Nigerien security apparatus was perceived by Nigeriens as a lack 
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of sovereignty and represented a source of resentment for both service members and the 
population.172 
Nigerien military personnel also mimicked certain types of improper behavior 
committed by colonial security forces, for example, sexual assault and fighting in 
bars.173 This inappropriate conduct, anathema to local customs and religion, undermined 
the relationship between armed forces and Nigerien population. Even today this kind of 
behavior is associated with Nigerien service members. For example, drinking lots of 
alcohol is considered to be typically a military behavior. 
During the colonial era, the recruitment of military personnel based on ethnic 
group resulted in an army composed in majority by soldiers from the Zarma ethnic group. 
This preference was a matter of colonial administration convention. Colonel Maurice 
Abadié, who conducted a study published in 1927, deemed “tirailleurs” from the Zarma 
ethnic group of western Niger to be better suited for military service than those from 
other ethnic groups.174 Specifically, he believed that the physical abilities of the people 
who inhabit the Nigerien Zarma regions of Djermaganda and Dallol Maouri were more 
appropriate for military service.175 Perhaps for this reason, most of the new recruits came 
from the west. Particularly, members of the Dosso royal family joined colonial forces. 
This ethnic imbalance of the armed forces generated the first seeds of division.  
At independence in 1960, like other African states, Niger inherited soldiers, 
equipment, and organizational structures from its former colonial power.176 The Nigerien 
Armed Forces emerged from an agreement between France and Niger that authorized 
Nigeriens enrolled in the French Armed Forces to join the future Nigerien Armed Forces. 
France had also provided equipment that served as the initial endowment for the Nigerien 
                                                 
172 Richard Higgott and Finn Fuglestad, “The 1974 Coup d’État in Niger: Towards an Explanation,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 13, no. 3 (September 1975): 383–398, 
www.jstor.org/stable/159846. 
173 Mahamane, “La Naissance de l’Armée Nationale au Niger,” 51. 
174 Mahamane, 48. 
175 Mahamane. 
176 Crocker, “Military Dependence: The Colonial Legacy in Africa,” 265–286. 
51 
 
security forces. However, while the transfer of personnel and equipment to the Niger 
Republic marked the establishment of the Nigerien Armed Forces, in practical terms 
these forces were very small and did not have any real operational capacity. 
2. Reluctance of the Diori Regime to Depart from Colonial Practices  
The Nigerien Armed Forces were officially created on August 1, 1961.177 The 
original armed forces were composed of personnel from the French Republican guard and 
Nigerien soldiers who had served in the French army.178 These initial armed forces 
lacked consistency and were mainly used to serve in policing tasks rather than defense 
and security. The French delegate for the defense of Overseas Zone number 1 (former 
West African colonies), General Michel de Brebisson, rated the Nigerien Armed Forces 
as a “local militia, small and lacking in professional personnel and a sense of military 
duty.”179 The deficiency of the Nigerien Armed Forces in military professionalism and 
the obvious paucity of their operational capacity seemed to be the desire of the Diori 
regime that depended on former colonial power for its security. 
Indeed, the post-colonial period was marked by the tremendous influence of the 
former colonial power on the military and the main features of Niger’s security issues 
fundamentally remained unchanged. First, most of the units stayed under the command of 
French officers and these French military personnel also held key military positions.180 
For example, French military personnel who were working as technical support in the 
Nigerien military administration numbered about 70 officers and NCOs.181 Despite the 
efforts to integrate Nigerien officers in the military hierarchy in the years following 
independence, the most important military positions remained under the control of the 
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French military, whose main purpose was to preserve French interests. This structure of 
the Nigerien security landscape could hardly generate coherent armed forces dedicated to 
Nigerien interests.  
More importantly, the deployment of two French combat companies that totaled 
450 soldiers delayed the prospect of building strong national security forces. These troops 
based in the capital Niamey stayed in Niger until the 1970s.182 They concentrated more 
on military power than on Niger’s armed forces of the time. This extraordinary presence 
of the French military, which resulted from a defense agreement of August 1, 1961, 
mainly ensured the protection of the Diori regime.183  
The government of the time led by President Hamani Diori was more concerned 
about the protection of his regime than the strength of Niger’s armed forces. Even the 
intense disagreement in early 1964 between Niger and Dahomey (the country known as 
Benin today) over two small islands in the Niger River did not push Nigerien authorities 
to strengthen the armed forces, which they feared would be a danger to the regime.184 
(Their fears were realized in 1974 when the armed forces overthrew the regime, which is 
discussed at the end of this section.) Marc Fontrier argues that “the latent anti-militarism 
that prevails among African political elites did not help to build coherent and effective 
armed forces.”185 The first successful military coups in Africa, which occurred in 1963 
in Togo, Congo, and Dahomey, reinforced the conviction of President Diori to temper 
any strengthening of the armed forces and rather to strengthen French presence in the 
country. The fear of a military coup among African political elites was real; as Claude E. 
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Welch argues, “Successful seizure of control in one state may touch off a series of 
coups.”186 Hence, Nigerien political leadership feared that this trend in some African 
countries could affect Niger.  
In addition, the strategy of Diori’s political party to protect the regime constituted 
a handicap for a comprehensive relationship between Nigerien civilian authorities and the 
new military elite. In December 1963, a crisis occurred between the Nigerien Armed 
Forces and civilian authorities. Military personnel mutinied to demand a better salary and 
to protest against the appointment of a disliked military leadership.187 This first mutiny, 
which had been resolved with the support of French troops, deeply undermined the trust 
of the regime toward its armed forces.188 President Diori came to the conclusion that he 
could not count on these security forces to repress the emerging revolt of the opposition 
party (Sawaba), which had founded an illegal private militia. Consequently, the President 
Diori’s party—the Parti Progressiste Nigérien du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain 
[PPN-RDA] (the Nigerien Progressive Party of the African Democratic Assembly)—also 
created its own militia to ensure the survival of the party and the regime.189 The creation 
of this militia was a confirmation that the regime was not willing to base its security on 
legal armed forces.  
In the same vein, President Diori’s need of cheap armed forces, meaning weaker 
ones, and his attempt to divert security services from their main purpose toward non-
military tasks undermined their professionalism. Although the few service members of 
the Nigerien Armed Forces were insufficient to meet the country’s security requirements, 
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the regime preferred to use them in non-military duties. For instance, President Diori 
called for the use of military personnel as the workforce in agriculture.190 In these 
circumstances, the militia of Diori’s party and the French troops were, practically, in 
charge of the protection of the country and the regime.191 For Nigerien authorities, 
remarks Aliou Mahamane, “Nigerien Armed Forces were simply used to complement the 
attributes of sovereignty.” Additionally, the shrewd use of Nigerien security forces as a 
coercive tool against the population had been perceived by the military as a willingness to 
undermine its relationship with the Nigerien people.192 Similar to the colonial practices, 
Nigerien authorities used security for the collection of taxes and repression.193 The Diori 
regime’s treatment of the military hindered civil-military relations. Thus, there was a real 
incentive among the officers’ corps to find a solution to the continuous deterioration of 
military status. 
Consequently, the Nigerien military elite engaged in a process of defending its 
corporate interests through nondemocratic regime change. According to Richard Higgott 
and Finn Fuglestad, the willingness of the armed forces to defend their corporate interests 
grew as the belief that Diori’s regime undermined their position became a painful 
reality.194 In their willingness to change their relationship with civilian authorities, the 
Nigerien Armed Forces attempted to overthrow the regime of President Hamani Diori in 
August 1973, but French troops intervened to protect the regime.195 Finally, on April 15, 
1974, the first successful military coup in Niger overthrew the regime of Diori and 
definitively marked a disruption in the relationship between civilian authorities and the 
armed forces. A new regime led by the military arose. The first head of state of that 
regime, which lasted 17 years, was Lieutenant Colonel Seyni Kountche. 
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B. NIGERIEN SECURITY FORCES DURING MILITARY RULE 
Among the main priorities the regime put in place after the military coup of April 
15, 1974, was the establishment of a security sector capable of handling internal and 
external threats. This took a particular importance for the new head of state, President 
Seyni Kountche. He said, “Nothing from this time will be undertaken in Niger that does 
not consider armed forces, guarantors of national independence, guarantors of the 
security of Niger and its people. [The] Armed forces will no longer be marginalized as in 
the past.”196 As defense minister himself, he engaged the security services in reforms to 
improve their responsiveness and their sense of patriotism. Sociopolitical movements and 
the economic crisis of the 1990s, however, hampered the security setting of the military 
regime.  
1. Building Effective Security Forces  
From the early months of the regime led by the Conseil Militaire Supreme (CMS) 
[Supreme Military Council], the new government demonstrated a clear commitment to 
make adjustments in security issues concerning the relationship with France. These 
changes started with the drastic reduction of French influence in Nigerien security issues. 
A few months after the military coup of April 1974, the French military camp was closed, 
and French troops based in Niamey left the country. As in many other countries formerly 
under French control, this departure of the French troops from the country conformed 
with the determined desire to improve autonomy in the political and military spheres. 
This decision of the Nigerien authorities intended to allow the promotion of a security 
sector based on national forces. The departure of French troops marked the beginning of 
a period that lasted more than a decade in which the Nigerien security sector went 
through qualitative and quantitative changes that improved their effectiveness.  
The military coup opened an era in which the exercise of power led to a profound 
transformation in the organization, its spirit, and the purpose of the Nigerien security 
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services. The new regime undertook an ambitious program to strengthen esprit de corps 
and patriotism within the Nigerien Armed Forces. President Kountché said, “from 1974 
to 1983, I had endeavored to raise and cultivate within the Nigerien Armed Forces the 
notion of patriotism and loyalty to the Nigerien people and to the Nigerien nation.”197 As 
the defense minister, the president engaged security forces in a reorganization process 
that permitted the creation of new units and a substantial increase of service members. 
The new security forces benefited from investments in new equipment as shown in the 
Appendix. For instance, security services purchased new aircraft, new armored vehicles, 
and other weaponry. These efforts intended to create coherent and well-equipped security 
services. Mirco Göpfert wrote, “Gendarmes (but also a considerable share of the 
population) tend to idealize Kountché and his rule until his death in 1987: everybody was 
well equipped and well paid; everybody was disciplined and honest; there was no 
corruption; all in all, everything and everybody worked the way they should.”198 
Additionally, the government promoted military cooperation with Niger’s 
strategic partners to strengthen the capacity of its security services. While France 
remained an important partner, other partners such as the United States and Germany 
provided military equipment and technical assistance. The United Stated approved to 
support Nigerien government with military assistance on June 9, 1980.199 The United 
States and Niger had the same security concerns regarding the activities of Libyan head 
of state Moammar Al Qaddafi in the region.200 Later, American engineers helped 
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renovate the airfield of Dirkou in 1984.201 This airfield located near the Libyan border 
has been strategic for the resupply of Nigerien security forces.  
In the 1980s, even though the Tuaregs had the support of the Libyan head of state, 
the security system put in place was so effective that it deterred the Tuaregs from 
initiating an insurrectional movement. At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, 
Libya provided military training for the Tuaregs, who intended to create a Tuareg nation. 
But the Nigerien security architecture of the time had good intelligence and could 
respond promptly to any limited destabilizing action. The Tuaregs’ first attempt to launch 
an uprising occurred in 1985 when an armed group of 14 people attacked the Nigerien 
city of Tchin-Tabaraden. The immediate and effective intervention of national armed 
forces and security forces successfully countered the attack.202 This event demonstrated 
the responsiveness of security services; ten assailants were apprehended, one was killed, 
and another injured. After this attempted insurrection, the country did not face any other 
attack until after the death of President Kountché in November 1987.203 
The new security architecture of the 1980s relied heavily on a strong intelligence 
service dedicated both to regime security and state security.204 The state police (le 
Bureau de Coordination et de Liaison [BCL], called simply “la coordination”) was the 
main intelligence service. It had agents and informants throughout Niger and in 
neighboring countries that made it an effective intelligence agency.205 The state police 
benefited from substantial investment that allowed the purchase new equipment. 
Moreover, members of this organization received high-quality training in different 
countries such as France and the United States. During military rule, the Nigerien state 
police was effective in gathering and disseminating intelligence.  
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Nevertheless, despite the achievements of the regime of President Kountché in 
dealing with security matters, the lack of accountability and proper oversight led to many 
abuses that tarnished the image of the regime and the security services. As there was no 
democratic civilian control of the security services—other than the personal control of 
President Kountché over the whole system—oppression and repression of political and 
military elites were common. The protection of the regime had become an important 
issue since the early years of its establishment, and that led to the removal of nearly all 
members of the CMS. Throughout Kountché’s tenure, certain numbers of CMS were 
arrested in 1976 and a few were even killed.206 Moreover, in the years following this 
purge, the military regime of Seyni Kountché further extended its control over other 
spheres of the society. His strong and fearful secret police was involved in many 
instances of misconduct. Like other secret police such as the so-called Stasi in East 
Germany, the powers of this institution led to increasing abuse. People could be arrested 
and jailed without any judicial procedure. There were few civil liberties and any attempt 
to criticize the regime could lead to an arrest.207 For example, some emerging politicians, 
for example, Sanoussi Tambari Zackou, were arrested and kept in a military camp in the 
small desert city of Dao Timmi for many years. As a result, there was a general panic 
among the Nigerien people and particularly within the administration where any 
misconduct was immediately reported to the president’s office and the people found 
responsible of misconduct were severely reprimanded. Consequently, the relationship 
between the military and the civilian elite deteriorated and clear opposition against the 
military rule started to form among students and bourgeoning civil society.  
2. Decay of Security Services during Transition to Democracy 
After the death of President Kountche in 1987, the Nigerien security services saw 
a gradual deterioration of their operational capabilities and the morale of the troops. In 
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the context of severe economic crisis and the emergence of social movements that 
demanded more democracy, many changes in the security setting hindered the Nigerien 
security services by negating all the achievements since the beginning of military rule. 
First, the financial difficulties during the tenure of President Ali Saïbou, who succeeded 
Kountché in November 1987, weakened the ability of the government to maintain the 
operational capacity of the security apparatus previously put in place. The new 
government, which was obliged to balance the national budget, had to reduce police and 
military expenditures.208 The symbol of this adjustment was the suppression of the 
powerful intelligence agency established by President Kountche.209 Second, President 
Saïbou accelerated the process of transition to democratic rule with full liberalization of 
the political sphere. To this end, a national conference took place from July 29 to 
November 3, 1991.210  
While this conference was an important step in the Nigerien process toward 
democracy, it negatively affected the cohesion of the Nigerien Armed Forces. The 
attempt of democratic forces to undermine the military establishment reached an 
unprecedented level during the national conference.211 It gave an opportunity for people 
to express their frustrations about the past behavior of the security services. The national 
conference set up a committee—the crimes and abuses commission—to investigate the 
military regime of the time.212 While the public hearings of this commission revealed the 
scale and gravity of certain crimes such as the extra-judicial execution of certain actors of 
attempted coups, its conclusions that led to judicial actions against individual service 
members disrupted the cohesion among the security forces. Certain officers faced various 
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charges for misconduct and human rights violations in the repression of student protests 
on February 9, 1989, and the brutal retaliation following the attack of young Tuaregs in 
Tchin-Tabaraden on May 7, 1990. Senior officers, however, did not accept any 
responsibility in these abuses. Finally, Captain Boureima Maliki was the highest ranked 
military personnel who faced judicial prosecution for his involvement in brutal repression 
of the Tchin-Tabaraden revolt. He was arrested along with some lower ranking service 
members. The way the hearings were conducted and the outcome that had blamed only 
lower ranking service members disrupted the discipline that was considered sacrosanct 
within the Nigerien defense and security forces. 
The decade of the 1990s was a pivotal period in which Nigerien security services 
caused political and security unrest that exacerbated the deterioration of discipline and 
cohesion as well as operational capabilities within those services. The government’s 
delay in paying salaries and the treatment of the security services during the national 
conference led to numerous mutinies in the 1990s.213  From 1992 to 2002, Niger 
experienced six military mutinies.214 During the first mutiny from February 25 to 26, 
1992, soldiers released officers and NCOs who were imprisoned during the national 
conference even though their prison terms were not complete.215 They also arrested 
temporarily some leaders of the transition government and demanded payment of service 
members’ salaries. On August 25, 1992, another munity occurred under the transitional 
regime. A few months after the new democratically elected President Mahamane 
Ousmane took over in April 1993, he faced another military mutiny. A military coup led 
by General Ibrahim Bare Mainassara occurred on January 27, 1996, to end a severe 
political crisis. The government led by Mainassara also faced a mutiny in October 1998. 
Another military coup overthrew the regime of Mainassara on April 9, 1999. The new 
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transitional government soon had to deal with a military mutiny in September 1999. 
Finally, the regime of the President Mamadou Tandja, who was elected in November 
1999, faced a mutiny from July 30 to August 8, 2000. These events and the resulting 
attitude of service members, who felt that they did not belong anymore in the Nigerien 
state apparatus they led for 15 years, generated a certain degree of fear among civilian 
leadership and reinforced the mistrust between civilian authorities and security forces. A 
summary of the successive coups and mutinies appears in Table 1. 






Hamani Diori    
(1960−1974) 
4/ 15/1974 - 12/3/1963 
Seyni Kountche 
(1974−1987) 
- 8/1975; 3/1976; 10/1983 - 






(1993−1996) 1/ 27/1996 
- 7/10/1993 
Mainassara Bare        
(1996−1999) 4/9/1999 - 10/1998 
Daouda M. Wanke - - 9/1999 
Mamadou Tandja       
(2000−2010) 2/18/2010 
- 7/30/2002 to 
8/8/2002 
Mahamadou Issoufou  
(2011−2020) 
- 12/16/2015 - 
 
 
216 Adapted from Addo Mahamane, Ibro Abdou, and Fatimata Sidikou, État de La Gouvernance En 
Afrique de L’ouest : Niger [State of Governance in West Africa: Niger] (Dakar, Sénégal: Council for the 




Consequently, the inadequate equipment and the crumbling cohesion among 
security forces hindered the effectiveness of the armed forces in the conduct of their 
missions. The effects of social movements combined with the economic difficulties 
hampered the operational capacity, the discipline, and the image of the security services. 
As a result, the Nigerien armed forces struggled to provide a comprehensive response to 
the Tuareg rebellion of the 1990s. These difficulties were certainly linked to the paucity 
of adequate equipment, but also to a lack of cohesion and discipline. In fact, officers who 
remember how their peers had been treated during the national conference lacked 
motivation and were not inclined to take any risk that could undermine their careers. 
There was a clear problem in the chain of command. This concern inside the Nigerien 
Armed Forces was confirmed during the mutinies that occurred in the 1990s as the orders 
issued by the leadership were not respected.  
C. REFORMS FOLLOWING THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
In the 1990s, the Nigerien security services went through limited institutional 
reforms. The political instability and the economic difficulties of the 1990s delayed any 
substantial improvement of the Nigerien security services, which consequently lost their 
operational capabilities and their internal cohesion. The main reforms conducted were 
those recommended by the national conference regarding the structural reorganization of 
security services. Prior to the national conference, the “Forces Armées Nationales du 
Niger” (Nigerien National Armed Forces) were composed of the Armée de Terre (Army), 
the Groupement Aérien National (National Air Wing), the Gendarmerie Nationale 
(National Gendarmerie), and the Garde Republicaine (Republican Guard) and were under 
the same command. The new organizational reform of 1992 restructured the Nigerien 
security forces in four distinct components: the Nigerien Armed Forces, the National 
Gendarmerie, the Republican Guard, and the National Police. 
The political stability following the general elections of 2000 gave a new 
opportunity to conduct substantial reforms in the security sector in a context marked by 
increasing security challenges linked to the second Tuareg rebellion and the rise of new 
security threats. Despite the brief interruption of the democratic process in 2010, the 
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recovery of the security sector continued with the support of Niger’s partners that helped 
to build the security services.  
1. Reforms of Armed Forces  
In 1992, shortly after the national conference, the Nigerien National Gendarmerie 
gained autonomy in a new reorganization of the Nigerien security services. The 
assessment made during the National Conference concluded that the National 
Gendarmerie and the National Guard could not properly perform their functions under the 
same command of the armed forces. As a result, the Nigerien National Armed Forces 
were reorganized, and the National Gendarmerie, which remained under the Ministry of 
Defense, became an independent corps under a new, separate command structure: The 
High Command (le Haut Commandement) of the National Gendarmerie. Decree No. 92–
34 of January 24, 1992, on the organization of the Ministry of Defense placed the high 
commander of the National Gendarmerie at the same hierarchical level as the chief of 
staff of the Nigerien Armed Forces.217 The purpose of this reform was to improve the 
effectiveness of the gendarmerie in the execution of its core missions of policing in rural 
areas and enhancing internal security.218   
After a decade of troubles within the security sector, President Tandja, a retired 
army colonel, undertook in the early 2000s to strengthen the security services and to 
reinforce discipline and cohesion. After two successful military coups and six mutinies in 
a decade, there was a strong incentive to create conditions to prevent another 
destabilizing event involving security services. Before 2003, there was no specific 
jurisdiction for military offenses, which were prosecuted in accordance with the 
provisions of the law No. 61–27 of July 15, 1961 establishing the Nigerien criminal code 
of justice. This law, however, was not adequate to deal with certain offenses in security 
sector. As a result, a reform of military justice was conducted in 2003 to deal with 
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increasing mutinies in the security sector. This reform implemented via law No. 2003–
010 of March 11, 2003, led to the establishment of the code of military justice, which has 
provided a comprehensive instrument to deal with matters of military justice. This law 
also created a military court system.  
Nevertheless, since its establishment, this military court system has faced a 
serious lack of qualified human resources. While civilian judges conducting the trials are 
professionals, their associate military judges and the military lawyers lack adequate 
training to perform their duties. These conditions have hindered the ability of military 
justice to constitute an essential pillar in the building of the Nigerien security services.  
Additionally, the rise of transnational security treats such as organized crime and 
terrorism as well as internal insurrection pushed President Tandja to implement more 
reforms. First, he restructured the security services. In December 2003 he reorganized the 
Nigerien Armed Forces in order to strengthen their operational capabilities. This 
reorganization transformed the National Military Air Wing into the new Niger Air Force 
(Armée de l’Air du Niger), which became the coequal of the Nigerien Army. These two 
forces now constituted the new Nigerien Armed Forces (Forces Armées Nigériennes 
[FAN]). The main purpose of this reform was to create conditions for a rapid 
development of the Nigerien Air Force in order to move from a transportation air wing to 
an efficient tool capable of delivering air power. The growing security challenges 
required an effective air force that could provide the indispensable air support to ground 
troops. 
2. Reform of Paramilitary Forces within the Interior Ministry 
The republican guard, a force mainly dedicated to security and policing in rural 
areas, was restructured in the new format of the Nigerien security apparatus. In 1992, the 
reorganization of security forces placed the Nigerien Republican Guard under the Interior 
Ministry to support policing activities in rural areas and to improve overall interior 
security stability. In 1997, the National Guard became the Forces Nationales 
d’Intervention et de Sécurité (FNIS) (National Intervention and Security Forces) and 
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incorporated the newly created Unités Sahariennes de Sécurité (USS) (Saharan Security 
Units).219 The integration of these units, composed of the former Tuareg rebels, in FNIS 
resulted from the implementation of the 1995 peace agreement between the Nigerien 
government and Tuareg rebels.220 These security units were supposed to provide security 
in the northern part of the country by using the area expertise of these former rebels. 
After 2002, President Tandja undertook to strengthen the FNIS, which has been 
under the Ministry of the Interior, to balance the increasing power of the FAN. The 
number of soldiers who had received advanced training rose quickly and the units of the 
National Guard of Niamey received heavy weapons similar to those used in the army. 
According to Göpfert, President Tandja and Interior Minister needed to utilize the FNIS 
as a regime-stabilizing counterforce to the military in order to avoid an eventual coup.221 
The Nigerien National Police also went through a transformation after the 
suppression of the state police. In implementing some significant changes in its structure 
and practices, the Nigerien National Police needed to focus its activities on human 
security rather than state security. According to Lisbet Ilkjaer and Sourghia Soumana 
Boureima, the Nigerien National Police conducted successful legal and institutional 
reforms between 1991 and 1993.222 They wrote, “The transformation of the police has 
included its mandate, missions, structure and mechanism of recruiting police officers.”223 
Since these reforms, the police has tended to fulfill its mission of protecting civilians and 
progressively abandoned its excessive repression against civilians. 
Thus, the National Police has continued its transformation toward more 
democratic policing. Since 2003, the Nigerien National Police Academy has provided 
various seminars on the protection of human rights during initial training and in-service 
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training of the National Police.224 Moreover, the institutional and legal reform program 
for the National Police—adopted in November 2007 by the Nigerien Parliament and 
planned for 2008–2012 period—has substantially improved the operational capabilities 
and the oversight of the police activities.225 Yet, this oversight has been conducted only 
internally by the office of the inspector general of the police.226 
3. Capacity-Building for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 
The growing terrorist threats in the Sahel region and the outbreak of a second 
Tuareg rebellion (2007–2009) pushed Nigerien authorities to hasten the strengthening of 
operational capabilities of the Nigerien security forces. First, the strengthening of security 
forces focused on the increase of human resources. From the early 2000s, the number of 
soldiers of the armed forces and gendarmerie rose remarkably. The number of service 
members in the army increased from 4,000 in 2000 to 14,200 in 2019.227 Likewise, the 
number of service members serving in the National Gendarmerie has more than tripled in 
two decades growing from 2,000 to 7,000 in the same period.228  The increase of 
personnel was accompanied by the creation of new units to cover the majority of the 
Nigerien territory. For instance, the Nigerien Army, the National Gendarmerie, and the 
National Guard have built special forces capable of dealing with violent extremist groups.  
In addition to the increase of personnel in the security forces, Niger has expanded 
its security expenditure in order to face the asymmetric war imposed by terrorist 
organizations. In this regard, Niger, which recognized the security challenges in the 
region at a relatively early stage, has steadily increased its security spending from 0.98 
percent of GDP in 2009 to 2.45 percent of GDP in 2018. As shown in Figure 6, this 
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growth of security expenditure—a 150 percent increase in a decade—reflects the 
tremendous efforts made by the Nigerien authorities to respond to the worsening of the 
security environment. 
 
 Niger security expenditure by percentage of GDP.229 
In the same vein, Nigerien authorities have improved the equipment and training 
capacities of the Nigerien security services. Since the outbreak of the second Tuareg 
rebellion in 2007, successive Nigerien governments have made considerable investment 
to equip security forces.230 Many programs designed to strengthen the security forces led 
to the acquisition of new helicopters, surveillance aircraft, attack aircraft, armored 
vehicles, and other various weapons.231 At the same time, the training of service 
members significantly increased to generate skilled soldiers competent in fighting violent 
extremists.  
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Nigerien authorities have also demonstrated a willingness to deepen their 
understanding of the evolving security challenges. To this end, the Nigerien government 
created a think tank called the Centre National d’Études Stratégiques et de Sécurité 
(CNESS) (National Center for Strategic Studies and Security). Nigerien authorities 
entrusted the conduct of national security studies to CNESS. Since its creation in August 
2016, Niger’s CNESS has made a significant contribution to the development of security 
policy. One of the major programs of the CNESS is the elaboration of a national security 
and defense policy. In the fulfillment of it missions, the CNESS participated in an Africa 
security forum organized in Morocco from October 8 to 10, 2017.232 This forum was on 
the inter-African cooperation on terrorism, radicalization, and transnational crime. 
Similarly, the CNESS in partnership with the Center for Strategic Studies for Africa 
(CESA) organized a training seminar on transnational organized crimes in Africa from 
January 13 to January 17, 2020.233 These kinds of forums and seminars give the actors of 
the Nigerien security sector a better understanding of the Nigerien and regional security 
landscape and hence improve their ability to produce better security policies.  
D. INVOLVEMENT OF NIGER’S PARTNERS IN REFORM EFFORTS 
Since its independence, Niger has received the support of foreign powers to meet 
the requirement of its security sector. Among its numerous partners, the United States, 
France, and Germany can be considered as traditional partners. They have played an 
important role in the country’s ability to face diverse security challenges for decades. 
Recently, some other partners such as Nigeria, Algeria, and Morocco, as well as 
international organizations (such as the African Union (AU), ECOWAS, the European 
Union, UN, and DCAF) have also contributed to the Nigerien efforts to curtail the rise of 
instability in the Sahel. The cooperation between Niger and its Western partners has 
developed quickly and has taken the form of various programs designed to strengthen the 
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Nigerien security sector engaged in a struggle against organized crime, insurgencies, and 
violent extremism. 
1. Evolving U.S. Involvement in Niger 
Since the early 2000s, Niger’s ungoverned spaces have constituted a security 
concern for the United States, which has “provided” various forms of support to help 
Niger build counterterrorism and peacekeeping capacity.234  After the terror attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the President George W. Bush administration launched a 
counterterrorism program termed the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) for Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger.235 The United States has seen in the ungoverned spaces of these 
countries potential areas where terrorist groups could prosper and hypothetically use 
them as a base to launch attacks against U.S. interests. The purpose of this program was 
therefore to assist and advise these countries’ militaries in their fight against terrorist and 
criminal groups in the Sahel region through an effective control of these spaces.236 The 
United States provided training and equipment to the first Nigerien special forces unit 
that was effective in the fight against terrorist groups and the Tuareg rebellion. Before its 
end in March 2004, PSI demonstrated that the United States could substantially improve 
the operational capacity of the regional security forces. The positive results of the PSI 
program led to another, broader program: the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP).237 
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As a multiyear program, TSCTP has helped Niger counter violent extremism 
(CVE) through a comprehensive approach.238 While encouraging regional security 
cooperation, this program has tried to develop the resilience of marginalized Nigerien 
communities and engage in capacity-building of security forces for a long-term 
counterterrorism endeavor.239 Since the outbreak of the Malian crisis in 2012, the U.S. 
support to the Nigerien security services has been consistent. The United States has 
trained many Nigerien battalions and has significantly improved the logistical capacity of 
the Nigerien security forces. For example, in addition to the continuous training 
programs, every year the United States has trained and equipped the Nigerien 
peacekeeping battalions before their deployment to Mali. The TSCTP program has 
played a particularly crucial role in the development of the Niger Air Force, which 
benefited from new aircraft for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 
medical evacuation, and transportation. Additionally, military exercises organized by the 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), such as Flintlock and Africa Endeavor, 
have helped Nigerien security services improve their fighting skills in hybrid warfare.240 
The United States has also supported regional initiatives in the fight against 
violent extremism in the Sahel. The indirect and direct U.S. financial support to the G5 
Sahel Joint Force, which has been set up to tackle the increasing security concerns in the 
Sahel region, has helped to strengthen the operational capabilities of the Nigerien 
battalions dedicated to this force. In this regard, the bilateral U.S. assistance to the G5 
Sahel countries from 2017 to the end of 2018 totaled about $111 million.241 
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Additionally, a number of Nigerien officers have already benefited from 
leadership training in the United States or during the temporary training sessions 
organized by the United States in Niger. This training has helped Nigerien officers in 
their daily duties. Moreover, a special program, the Security Governance Initiative, was 
launched in January 2015 to enhance the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of 
the management and oversight of security policy and practice.242 The ultimate goal for 
Niger has been the effective management of the human, material, and financial resources 
in the security sector.243 Because of committed senior level defense official input in SGI, 
the government of Niger started to codify many of these changes, and the program is 
widely seen as successful.244 
Another example of U.S. engagement in Niger is the Conventional Weapons 
Destruction (CWD) program, started in 2015. Through CWD, the U.S. State Department 
helps Nigerien security forces with securing their weapon stashes, and providing weapons 
disposal.245 This program solves a problem for Niger, as secure storage space is severely 
limited, and thus excess weapons become both a logistical burden and a ripe target for 
theft.246 The United States has provided more than $4 million for CWD activities in 
Niger and the program has funded the restoration of 26 armories to safeguard government 
stockpiles and enabled the destruction of more than 15 tons of ammunition.247 
Additionally, the CWD program has increased the Government of Niger’s capabilities to 
secure its own munitions by giving technical aid to Niger’s National Commission for the 
Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons, and these efforts were viewed as a success.248 
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2. European Efforts 
France has remained an important actor in Nigerien security matters. Most 
Nigerien military personnel have received training in French schools, and Niger has 
benefited from French aid in military equipment and technical training. The growing 
threat to security has pushed France to increase its military footprint in the Sahel region. 
Its anti-terrorist operation Barkhane has an important component in Niger. Additionally, 
France has been engaged in the capacity-building of the Nigerien security services. For 
instance, France provided three Gazelle SA320 helicopters and other military equipment 
to Nigerien security forces, and built a Nigerien anti-terrorist unit, which was under the 
Nigerien intelligence service, the General Directorate of Documentation and External 
Security of Niger (Direction Générale de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Exteriéure 
[DGDSE]). This unit was very effective in gathering intelligence about violent extremist 
organizations.  
Similarly, Germany has increased it security cooperation with Niger and has 
worked with Nigerien security services to strengthen their operational capabilities and the 
safety of military bases. During a visit by German Chancellor Angela Merkel to Niger in 
October 2016, German Ambassador to Niger Bernd von Münchow-Pohl said, “For us, 
Niger is a central partner and a key country in the fight against terrorism and illegal 
migration from West Africa.”249 While Germany has not yet provided any lethal 
armaments to Niger, it has participated in the improvement of the infrastructure of some 
military schools, the building of the engineer corps, and the tactical training of infantry 
units. Furthermore, Germany has built a military base in Niamey to provide intra-theater 
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medical support to its troops based in Mali and to the troops of countries that are fighting 
terrorist organizations in the Sahel.250 
Likewise, highly concerned about the complex security crisis in the Sahel, the 
European Union has also played an increasing role in the capacity-building of the 
Nigerien security sector. The EU and individual states such as Italy and Belgium have 
helped strengthen the Nigerien security sector in order to curb violent extremist activities 
and illegal migration to Europe. The EU has been conducting three programs intended to 
sustain Niger’s effort to build the security sector. First, EUCAP Sahel Niger, which was 
originally established to “support the capacity-building of Nigerien security actors to 
fight organized crime and terrorism,” shifted from 2014 to focus on migration issues.251 
The Rapid Action Groups (Groupes d’Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au 
Sahel [GAR-SI Sahel])—built in all G5-Sahel countries with the support of the EU—are 
specialized in border control and counterterrorism. This EU project has a budget of €41.6 
million ($49 million) for the five Sahel countries.252 A multilayer project named Push for 
Justice and Security in Niger (Appui à la Justice et à la Sécurité au Niger) [AJUSEN]) is 
funded by the EU (€90 million [$106 million]) and intervenes in the justice, security, and 
border management sectors.253 
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3. International Organizations 
International organizations have also played an essential role in the transformation 
of the Nigerien security sector. The capacity-building of the Sahelian security forces has 
been one of the core elements of the UN counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel.254 The 
United Nations has provided technical support to the Nigerien security forces and has 
actively participated into the mobilization of financial resources for Sahelian security 
forces. Moreover, it has delivered sustained logistical support to G5 Sahel Joint Task 
Force battalions.255 For instance, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2391 of 2017 
and Resolution 2480 of 2019 have created mechanisms to enhance the capacities of G5 
battalions through direct logistical support from the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).256 This support has improved the 
readiness and the mobility of the Nigerien security forces engaged in the fight against 
terrorism. 
In addition, the United Nations has helped address human rights violations 
allegedly committed by the Sahelian security forces. The UN has been extremely worried 
about human rights violations in the Sahel.257 To address this problem, which can hinder 
donors’ willingness to support Sahelian countries, the United Nations has provided 
training on the matter through its agencies and has put pressure on the relevant 
governments to take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and security of the 
civilian populations.258 
The African Union and Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) have also played an important role in the strengthening of Nigerien security 
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forces. Their diplomatic engagement has brought the critical security situation in the 
Sahel to the attention of the international community.259 ECOWAS has established a 
number of counterterrorism organizations such as the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism 
Coordination Bureau (ECOCTB), the ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training Centre, and 
the Counter Terrorism Technical Assistance Directory to support its member states in 
their efforts to effectively fight terrorism.260 
E. CONCLUSION 
Niger’s security sector transformation has suffered from poor civil-military 
relations, a colonial legacy, and the militarization of Nigerien politics as well as the 
politicization of the military, which has undergone various reforms at different periods of 
Niger’s history. Coercive military practices and certain behaviors inherited from the 
French military have also hindered Nigerien civil-military relations. After independence, 
the overwhelming influence of the French military in the Nigerien security sector delayed 
any reform that could have permitted the building of strong security forces. This French 
influence was needed by Nigerien authorities who feared a military coup. After the 
realization of their fear on April 15, 1974, the military regime that followed undertook a 
strengthening of the security sector. Nigerien security forces, which led the country for 
17 years, became an important actor in the Nigerien sociopolitical ecosystem. The 1990s 
and 2000s were decades characterized by three military coups, six mutinies, and two 
Tuareg rebellions. These events and the rise of terrorism have shaped the Nigerien 
security sector. The Nigerien government and its partners have made considerable efforts 
to improve the resilience of the Nigerien security sector in an increasingly volatile 
security environment. Yet, the relative success of the reforms undertaken reflects the 
complexity of Nigerien civil-military relations that have thwarted the building of security 
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IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE NIGERIEN 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Niger’s security services have attempted to adapt to evolving security threats 
throughout the past 50 years in an endeavor to ensure the stability of the country. These 
reforms have to some extent improved the effectiveness of the Nigerien security services 
and have helped them prevent a collapse in security. However, the Nigerien security 
services have found it difficult to fight violent extremist organizations. Several 
shortcomings have impeded the fighting capabilities of certain units and thus have 
hindered the effectiveness of the overall security sector in dealing with new security 
challenges. Among these shortcomings are the lack of trust between civilian authorities 
and the military elite, the weak governance in the security sector, the lack of local 
ownership of programs that are being implemented by foreign partners, and the poor 
coordination of the security related activities. 
This chapter first discusses the strengths that have helped the Nigerien security 
services address such internal and external security threats as organized crime, rebellions, 
and violent extremism. Then, the chapter describes the weaknesses that have jeopardized 
Nigerien resilience in an unstable Sahel. 
A. STRENGTHS OF THE NIGERIEN SECURITY SECTOR 
The relative success of the Nigerien security services can be attributed to their 
increasing operational capacity in the Sahel region, the support of the Nigerien 
population, the engagement of the Nigerien civil society, and the cooperation that Niger 
has maintained with its strategic partners. 
1. Increasing Operational Capacity 
The experience that the Nigerien security forces have gained from internal 
conflicts they have fought and international peace operations in which they have 
participated, as well as the courageous capacity-building efforts undertaken by Nigerien 
authorities, have helped to strengthen the security forces’ professionalism and their 
78 
 
ability to combat non-state actors. As a general rule, a well-trained and well-commanded 
armed force that participates in regular military engagements acquires expertise that is 
difficult to obtain even with the most complex exercises. For instance, the special 
battalion deployed that has already participated in many military engagements has shown 
itself more effective than other battalions. The frequent engagements since the 1990s 
have transformed Nigerien soldiers into experienced fighters in the Sahel-Sahara 
region.261 The recurrent armed uprisings in the northern part of the country have helped 
to strengthen the combativeness of the Nigerien security forces, which have also gained 
experience in patrolling and fighting in Nigerien desert areas.262 In comparison to other 
West African armies, Christopher Griffin remarks that the Nigerien Army “is a force with 
a great deal of experience in desert warfare, fighting multiple Touareg [sic] rebellions 
during the 1990s and 2000s.”263 Although Nigerien military leadership did not seek these 
engagements, they have certainly contributed to the improvement of the Nigerien security 
forces. 
Moreover, the participation of Nigerien contingents in international peace 
operations has helped to hone the professionalism of the Nigerien security forces. Pre-
deployment training has provided the Nigerien troops necessary skills to meet the 
standards of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and their interaction with other 
contingents has strengthened their knowledge of complex warfare. For instance, certain 
Nigerien units have improved their operational capacities since they began participating 
in the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program in 
2005.264 In all, this program has strengthened the physical and technical skills of the 
soldiers. 
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Aware of Niger’s vulnerabilities linked to ungoverned spaces, the government has 
taken the threat of violent extremism seriously since the early 2000s. The 2006 Tuareg 
rebellion in Mali was a sign for the administration of President Mamadou Tandja that 
Niger could face the same security challenges.265 The asymmetric threats associated with 
these types of engagements quickly became a major concern for the Nigerien security and 
defense forces. Therefore, Niger authorities have reinforced the security sector. Nigerien 
military leadership has attempted to adapt security tools to the new context characterized 
by the rise violent extremist organizations. Increased access to resources, more training, 
and better equipment have strengthened the Nigerien Armed Forces.266 The mobility of 
the Nigerien forces has increased, and the intelligence gathering ability has significantly 
improved with the introduction of new units dedicated to the collection of intelligence on 
the battlefield as well as the use of ISR assets.267 
At the same time, the special forces have gained combat skills and adequate 
equipment. The first Nigerien unit dedicated to the fight against terrorism, which was 
developed with the support of the American program, PSI, has demonstrated its 
effectiveness in fighting asymmetric warfare.268 This unit played an important role in 
defeating the MNJ armed uprising. Subsequently, several units—such as the special 
battalion for intelligence (bataillon Spécial de renseignement [BSR]) and the special 
intervention battalion (bataillon Spécial d’intervention [BSI])—of these anti-terrorist 
forces were created and equipped. In early 2018, Niger had moved ahead in the process 
of generating special forces with the aim of creating 12 BSI over five years.269 As a 
result, Niger has developed some units that are relatively effective in fighting violent 
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extremist groups. Well trained, well equipped, and highly mobile, these units have 
specific abilities that have bolstered the effectiveness of the Nigerien security forces. 
Griffin argues that “the Nigerien Army has proved to be surprisingly effective against 
Boko Haram,” as Boko Haram has failed to establish solid bases within Nigerien 
territory.270 This observation confirms the improvement of the Nigerien security forces. 
2. Public Support of the Nigerien Security Forces 
Despite some isolated human rights violations committed by certain service 
members, the Nigerian population remains largely committed to the Nigerian security 
forces, perhaps because so many Nigerien families have been touched by violence at the 
hands of extremists. The ongoing struggle against violent extremist organizations has 
caused the death of many Nigerien soldiers.271 Many Nigerien families have also 
experienced the loss of relatives or friends. This feeling of losing parents or friends due to 
the barbaric actions of the violent extremist groups has mobilized the people behind their 
armed forces. This support has taken different forms. On February 15, 2015, hundreds of 
thousands people participated in marches that were organized across the country to 
support and encourage Nigerien security forces in their fight against Boko Haram.272 
Moreover, civil society organizations and the media organized a fundraiser for service 
members that collected more than $4 million in one night during a telethon held on 
February 20, 2015.273 When several terrorist attacks against Nigerien military units 
caused the deaths of more than 200 service members in December 2019, the Nigerien 
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people showed their compassion to the security services through a remarkable 
mobilization during funerals. Prayers were held through the country and certain 
companies and businesses closed for collective prayers.274 
3. Engagement of Civil Society in Security Sector Governance 
Nigerien civil society organizations have played an important oversight role in the 
Nigerien security sector, but not to the extent that they alone can prompt good practices. 
Nigerien civil society has developed capacities in enhancing oversight. In this role they 
are supposed to complement the executive and legislative branches in charge of the 
institutional oversight. Civil society has often conducted its own investigations in order to 
identify wrongdoing in the security sector and to encourage the government to take 
necessary corrective actions to ensure accountability and effectiveness for the security 
forces. For instance, on March 15, 2020, Nigerien civil society organizations called for a 
march to strongly protest the government’s initial proposal to only ensure the 
reimbursement of funds unlawfully used by the perpetrators of an embezzlement scheme 
within the Ministry of Defense.275 Nevertheless, despite the engagement of Nigerien 
civil society, its oversight efforts cannot serve as a substitute for a genuine and effective 
oversight mechanism, which is primarily the mission of the executive and legislative 
branches that have more access to the Nigerien security apparatus. 
4. Fruitful Cooperation with Regional and International Partners 
The cooperation of the Nigerien security sector with its Western counterparts has 
constituted a central element of Nigerien security forces’ resilience. First, Nigerien 
                                                 
274 Press Afrik, “Niger: Le Douloureux Hommage aux 71 Soldats Tués à Inates [Niger: The Painful 
Tribute to the 71 Soldiers Killed at Inates],” December 14, 2019, https://www.pressafrik.com/Niger-le-
douloureux-hommage-aux-71-soldats-tues-a-Inates_a209113.html. 
275 Niagalé Bagayoko, “Sahel : l’Indispensable Gouvernance plus Vertueuse des Budgets de Défense. 
Des Services d’Inspection, la Société Civile et des Parlementaires sont Montés au Créneau pour 
Révéler et Prévenir des Malversations. Le Signe de la Quête d’une Meilleure Ethique [Sahel : The 
Indispensable more Virtuous Governance of Defense Budgets. Inspection Services, Civil Society and 
Parliamentarians Have Stepped up to the Plate to Reveal and Prevent Wrongdoing. The Sign of the Quest 




security forces have benefited from various training opportunities and have improved 
their professionalism by working with foreign soldiers. The interaction of the Nigerien 
security forces with professional Western armed forces has contributed to the 
improvement of the fighting skills and professionalism of the Nigerien troops. Joint 
operations involving both foreign and Nigerien troops have not only been a powerful tool 
to curb violent extremists’ actions but also a practical method for Nigerien soldiers to 
learn useful techniques of asymmetric warfare.276 According to the White House, about 
730 American troops including MQ9 drone operators were stationed in Niger in 2018.277 
In addition to the experience sharing, these troops have provided vital strategic 
intelligence that supports Nigerien engagements against violent extremist organizations. 
The cooperation has also created the conditions to build and refurbish military 
facilities that have improved the operational capacity of the Nigerien security forces. For 
instance, while Germany funded the construction of a second runway in Niamey, the 
United States built a $100 million air base in Agadez as well as a runway in Dirkou.278 
These facilities are crucial for operational and logistic planning. 
Similarly, Niger has benefited from various types of military equipment provided 
by donors. The equipment that donor countries provided to Niger has constituted an 
                                                 
276 Nicolas Desgrais, Le G5 Sahel, en Réaction à la Mutation de l’Environnement Stratégique 
Sahélien Politiques Régionales de Coopération et Niveaux d’Engagement des Etats Membres [The G5 
Sahel, in Response to the Transformation of the Sahelian Strategic Environment: Regional Cooperation 
Policies and Levels of Commitment of Member States] (Paris, France: Fondation pour la Recherche 
Stratégique, June 2008), 44, 
https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-
musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/76.pdf. 
277 White House, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Washington, DC: The White House, June 8, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-
president-pro-tempore-senate-4/. 
278 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Military Engagement of the U.S., France, and Germany in the Sahel. 
Towards Liberal Peace by Post-modern Intervention?” in Sicherheits- und Friedensordnungen in Afrika: 
Nationale und regionale Herausforderungen, ed. Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Michael Staack (Berlin, 
Germany: May 15, 2019), 74.  
83 
 
indispensable complement to those that Niger can purchase with its limited resources. In 
this regard, the United States has been consistently willing to support Nigerien efforts.279 
B. WEAKNESSES OF THE NIGERIEN SECURITY SECTOR 
Although some progress has been made in building the capacity of the Nigerien 
security forces, the inability of certain units to handle violent extremist attacks 
underscores certain weaknesses of the entire Nigerien security sector. The rise of violent 
extremism in the Sahel has threatened Niger’s stability at three of its borders 
simultaneously. As Cristina Barrios observes, “Niger’s own ability to guarantee national 
security is now in question. The military is relatively strong and disciplined, but it is 
overstretched.”280 In these circumstances the difficulties of the security sector become 
obvious. The Nigerien security sector has undeniably suffered from weak civil-military 
relations, deficit of governance, evident shortcomings in the handling of assistance 
provided by Niger’s strategic partners, and a poor coordination of security-related 
activities. 
1. Weak Governance  
The weak governance of the Nigerien security sector has undermined the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of Nigerien security services. Since the democratic 
transition in the 1990s, the governance of the Nigerien security sector has become an 
issue of great concern. The Nigerien security sector has developed an executive-centered 
system in which oversight and democratic control of the security services remain either 
relatively weak or non-existent. The Ministry of Defense and Interior Ministry possess 
inspection directorates in charge of overseeing security services. The General Inspection 
of the Armed Forces and National Gendarmerie (IGA/GN) is in charge of overseeing the 
activities of these forces. A similar oversight body within the Interior Ministry is in 
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charge of the National Police and the National Guard. However, the actions of these 
oversight bodies have been limited. According to Nigerien law, an internal audit of 
military procurements should be made every six months.281 A report conducted by the 
inspection service of the IGA/GN from October 2, 2019 to February 14, 2020 revealed 
that these requirements have never been met due to some internal and external 
contingencies.282 
Additionally, legislative oversight over the Nigerien security sector has been poor 
and ineffective.283 Niger’s constitution provides oversight power to the National 
Assembly, but the parliament has not effectively exercised this oversight power due to 
several reasons. First, members of Parliament (MP) do not have necessary knowledge to 
oversee military activities. The Defense and Security Committee (DSC), which is in 
charge of the legislative oversight of the security forces, lacks a clear understanding of 
the Nigerien security challenges that it should help address through effective oversight 
and democratic control. Second, the parliament does not fully exercise its oversight 
responsibilities. According to Transparency International (TI), despite the existence of 
oversight functions in the form of parliamentary committees, defense institutions 
historically have been exempted from the same degree of scrutiny given to other Nigerien 
institutions.284 Apart from a bit of involvement during the defense budgeting process, 
DSC has never conducted true oversight of the spending by the security services. 
Moreover, as mentioned by TI, “Despite recent promising government initiatives and 
reforms, attempts to improve defense governance in Niger are hindered by high levels of 
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secrecy and defense exceptionalism, which severely limit oversight and control of 
defense institutions by parliament and audit mechanisms.”285 These shortcomings are 
depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2. Risk of corruption indicators in security sector.286 
Overall Country Score E 22 Very High Risk 
Political Risk  E 31  Operational Risk  F 
International Instruments B 75 Corruption Monitoring in Operations F 8 
Budget Transparency & Detail  C  63 Military Doctrine  F  0 
Anticorruption Policy  C  63 Operational Training  F  0 
Natural Resources  C  58 Forward Planning  F  0 
Organized Crime Links  C  50 Controls in Contracting  F  0 
Defense Policy Debate  D  44  
Legislative Scrutiny  D  42 Procurement Risk  E  17 
Organized Crime Policing  D  42 Procurement Legislation  B  75 
Anticorruption Institutions D  42 Procurement Cycle  C  50 
Budget Availability  D 33 Supplier Sanctions  D 33 
Budget Scrutiny  E 25 Tender Board Controls  E 31 
CSO Engagement  E 25 Business Compliance Standards  E 25 
External Audit  E 17 Anti-Collusion Controls  E  25 
Defense Committee  E 17 Procurement Requirements  E 17 
Acquisition Planning  F 8 Open Competition v. Single Sourcing  F  13 
Defense Income  F 8 Contract Award / Delivery  F 13 
Risk Assessments  F 0 Procurement Oversight Mechanisms  F 8 
Internal Audit  F 0    
Intelligence Services Oversight  F 0    
Lobbying  F 0    
 
Consequently, this lack of effective oversight and democratic control has led to a 
serious paucity of transparency and accountability, which has fueled corruption in the 
Nigerien security sector. Indeed, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2019 
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suggested that corruption has expanded in Niger despite the apparent determination of 
Nigerien authorities to fight this calamity. In 2019 Niger was listed among the most 
corrupt countries in the world, with a score of just 32 points out of 100, where 100 is the 
least corrupt.287 Specifically, many scholars have pointed out the corrupt nature of the 
Sahelian security institutions. Zoë Gorman argues that the stabilization efforts of the 
Sahel have relied on weak and corrupt institutions.288 In Niger, the fact that security has 
been jeopardized by corruption is mainly due to insufficient control and oversight over 
the security sector. According to TI, Niger has been ranked near the bottom of indices for 
defense budget transparency in part due to the absence of an effective auditing 
mechanism.289 As a result, Niger’s security sector has suffered from large-scale 
mismanagement of defense resources.290  
The widespread corruption in the Nigerien security sector has seriously 
undermined the capacity of the security forces to deal with violent extremist groups, 
which further destabilizes the country. Indeed, the Nigerien security budget has increased 
significantly during last decade, but funds available for security services are limited in 
absolute terms. While the Nigerien Armed Forces seem to be relatively well-funded as a 
percentage of GDP, in absolute terms they remain underfunded. For instance, in 2018, the 
Nigerien security budget, which was only $230 million, could be considered insignificant 
in comparison to the budget of countries facing similar security challenges, like Tunisia 
with $844.23 million.291  
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Most of these funds have been wasted through corruption.292 There is sufficient 
evidence to argue that corruption has constituted one of the underlining factors of the 
Nigerien security sector’s relative ineffectiveness. By not allocating contracts to the most 
efficient provider of services, the Nigerien security bureaucracy has created conditions 
that undercut state effectiveness in providing necessary equipment to security services. 
For instance, in 2019, 1,000 unserviceable AK-47 weapons of an old stockpile were 
provided to the Nigerien security forces.293 According to a statement made by the Chief 
of Defense Staff, General Ahmed Mohamed, defective ammunition was also provided to 
the armed and security forces.294 These unusable arms have undermined the 
combativeness and the morale of soldiers during the confrontation with terrorists. In the 
case of Niger especially, corruption has diverted scarce security allocations and hence has 
blocked supplies that the military requires to fight violent extremist organizations.  
In late 2019, after the deadliest terrorist attack against a Nigerien military unit, the 
investigation ordered by the president and conducted under the supervision of the newly 
appointed defense minister, Issoufou Katambé, revealed extensive and organized 
corruption in the Ministry of Defense. The audit that concerned the contracts awarded 
from 2017 to 2019 disclosed that about $137 million was lost to corruption.295 This 
amount represented nearly 23 percent of the total budget—about $603 million—of the 
Defense Ministry during the same period.296 
In the defense and security bureaucracy, the civilian agents’ lack of knowledge 
and expertise about security issues has constituted another important factor that has 
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impeded the governance of the Nigerien security sector. To be handled properly, security 
matters require skilled personnel. Most of the time, civilian political appointees in the 
Nigerien security sector lack expertise. Generally, they are not specialists in security 
issues and they are frequently replaced as the regimes change. This practice conforms 
with the view of José A. Olmeda, who argues that the micromanagement of the security 
sector by political appointees who generally have lesser practical experience, diminishes 
the effectiveness of the security forces.297 
2. Lack of Trust between Civilian Authorities and the Military Elite 
The intervention of the military in the political arena has shaped the relationship 
between the security forces and other actors of Nigerien society. Since the first military 
coup in 1974 that ended the one-party regime of the President Diori, Nigerien defense 
and security forces have remained a major actor in Nigerien politics. After the democratic 
transition in early 1990s, Niger experienced three successful military coups that 
interrupted the democratic process, at least two thwarted coup attempts, and six military 
mutinies. These events have contributed to the deterioration of the civil-military 
relationship throughout the last three decades. 
Unfortunately, the Nigerien people have come to perceive their armed and 
security forces as an influential actor that can arbitrate Nigerien politics. The military 
coups have received significant public support and to some extent the backing of some 
political elites.298 Despite the fact that this kind of regime change is illegal and anti-
democratic, a large part of the Nigerien public seems to accept coups as a means to settle 
frequent political instabilities that Niger has experienced. As Nadine Olafsson argues, 
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such military coups can be considered as an “act of social justice.”299 Thus, it is rooted in 
the perception of the Nigerien public that the actions of military elites to end these 
regimes have been necessary. Moreover, political actors seem to believe that a military 
coup is the easiest way to prompt a regime change. Nigerien political elites have 
observed that overthrown parties fail to win the subsequent elections. Hence, the military 
coups tend to favor opposition parties. 
Certain Nigerien heads of state have tried different approaches to deal with this 
situation. While President Diori had simply shown a reluctance to build strong security 
forces due to fear that such forces could overthrow his regime, President Tandja tried to 
empower the National Guard to balance the Armed Forces.300 These two methods failed 
to prevent military coups as President Diori in 1974 and President Tandja in 2010 were 
both overthrown by the military. Incapable of alleviating this persistent threat of military 
coup, successive Nigerien governments have lost confidence in the military and engaged 
in extensive surveillance of their own military. Conway Waddington remarks, “The arrest 
of the nine alleged coup plotters in December 2015 came after a month-long surveillance 
operation. Such surveillance is itself potentially indicative of the deep mistrust and 
dysfunctional relationship between the executive and the armed forces.”301 It has become 
difficult for the executive branch to find a balance between the need to strengthen the 
armed and security forces and the necessity to control the increasing power of these 
forces that have enjoyed longstanding involvement in politics. 
Consequently, the mistrust between the Nigerien executive branch and the 
military elites has hindered a coherent transformation of the armed forces so 
indispensable to meeting the growing threats.302 This lack of confidence affects many 
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aspects of the Nigerien security sector. First, poor civil-military relations have hampered 
the ability of the executive branch to appoint effective leadership for security forces. As 
political stability is also crucial for security, the civilian authorities cannot only focus on 
the building of strong and effective security forces without creating conditions to prevent 
them from becoming a potential risk for political stability. Therefore, when appointing 
officers, civilian authorities have often taken into consideration not only the intrinsic 
values of the officers but also their loyalty to the regime. This concern of decision makers 
has led to an inappropriate management of Niger’s scarce human resources.303 In these 
circumstances of poor civil-military relations, the Nigerien security sector has lost its 
rationality and cohesiveness. 
Second, in certain instances, complex civil-military relations have directly 
impacted the strength of the Nigerien defense and security forces. The lack of 
professionalism among certain military leaders has generated an incentive to engage in 
politics, pushing the executive branch to deem that the units they command represent a 
danger for the regime and hence need to be demolished. For instance, one of the most 
effective anti-terrorist units, which had operated under the DGDSE, was dismantled in 
2016 because its commander, Major Issoufou Oumarou, was involved in the attempted 
coup of December 2015.304 Commenting on this military coup attempt, President 
Mahamadou Issoufou contended that “it is nothing more and nothing less than a high 
treason not only against the civil institutions of the state but also against the military 
intuition itself. It is a stab in the back of their brothers assigned to the front of the 
fighting.”305 In fact, the dismantling of this unit was a clear disappointment. It took many 
years for the leadership of DGDSE to train and equip this unit with the support of French 
cooperation. At the time it was dismantled in early 2016, it had established a loose 
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intelligence network in the northwest of the country—the so-called area of three frontiers 
between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—and was able to deter the violent extremist 
movements by conducting quasi-permanent security operations in the region. The 
dismantling of this unit might be one of the explanations for the deterioration of the 
security situation observed in this region since 2016. 
Third, the deficit in confidence that Nigerien civilian authorities have for the 
defense and security forces has also led to the establishment of both passive and active 
measures to protect regimes in Niger. The necessity to protect the regimes from a military 
coup has compelled the successive regimes to build a strong presidential security force 
with a robust presidential guard and an intelligence service that have required substantial 
resources to accomplish their missions. The 2019 general budget allocated nearly $14 
million (6,912,784,615 FCFA) to the Security of the Presidency of the Republic.306 If the 
security forces did not represent any danger to the regimes, the investment of human 
resources and equipment dedicated to protecting regimes could better serve to strengthen 
security forces in their main missions. 
Finally, in an attempt to curry favor with the military elites, civilian authorities 
have been reluctant to exercise full and comprehensive oversight of the security sector. 
The fear of the military has made civilian authorities less involved in the management 
and the control of the security forces, which are therefore subject to the mismanagement 
of resources and inequality among service members.307 The recent attempt to investigate 
the Nigerien security sector in 2020 has not yet provided a satisfactory solution to the 
governance deficiency. 
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3. Lack of Local Ownership in Foreign Interventions 
Vulnerabilities in the Sahel’s ungoverned areas have led to the increasing 
involvement of international actors in the strengthening of the Nigerien security sector. 
The problems of ungoverned spaces have also led to overlapping interests in the region. 
While the Sahelian states are interested in fighting security instability, illegal immigration 
is the priority for the European Union. 
Since the Valletta Summit on Migration organized by the EU in November 2015, 
the fight against illegal migration from Africa into Europe has become one of the main 
priorities of the EU in the Nigerien security sector.308 Bearing in mind the internal 
European pressure against migration, the EU has undertaken a more active role in curbing 
migration flow from Africa.309 To this end, the EU strategy against illegal migration has 
aimed to stop migrants before they cross such major transit countries as Niger, which has 
become a strategic country for the EU.310 Indeed, there is a clear link between migration 
and security, but the shift of the EU priorities in the Sahel region has hindered its 
engagement to help build the Nigerien security forces according to the country’s 
priorities. Thus, the European programs in capacity-building—for example, GAR-SI 
Sahel—tend to put more emphasis on the National Police, the National Guard, and the 
National Gendarmerie, which are the primary forces intervening in the fight against 
illegal migration.311 
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The new approach has not given sufficient consideration to Niger’s security 
priority: terrorism rather than migration.312 In 2018, the G5 Sahel garnered $100 million 
from the EU.313 This amount is less than the cumulative budget of $136.5 million of the 
European Capacity Building (EUCAP Sahel) mission in Mali and Niger dedicated to 
enhancing interior forces’ capacity to fight illegal immigration to Europe. This approach 
has also overstretched interior forces. In its willingness to satisfy the EU, Niger has made 
enormous efforts to control the flow of migrants. A substantial number of Nigerien 
security personnel have been devoted to this task.314 The interior patrols have increased 
tremendously, and a certain effectiveness has been observed in the control of the 
migration flow but maintaining this system has contributed to overstretched security 
forces. 
Additionally, the increasing efforts to stop migration have destroyed the migrants’ 
cross-border smuggling networks that provided important informal economic 
opportunities for many young people in northern Niger. The EU programs have not 
offered credible alternatives to these young people who otherwise tend to join 
transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.315 The unintended result has 
been the strengthening of criminal networks that Nigerien security forces have to fight. 
The perceived overlapping interests in the region pose another obstacle to the 
achievement of the Nigerien project of building a strong security sector. Several experts 
believe that some countries have used the international organizations (EU, UN) to pursue 
their own interests in the Sahel. For instance, Eric Komlavi Hahonou wrote that “some 
European experts even argue that EUCAP-Sahel Niger ‘is a French mission under a 
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European flag.’”316 These remarks suggest that EUCAP-Sahel Niger has pursued an 
agenda different from what EU initially planned. In fact, French companies have gained 
some profits notably in the security sector and mining industries (Uranium in Niger).317 
There is a perception that France’s leading role in the Sahel is motivated by these 
interests. This view has been reinforced by what Yvan Guichaoua considers as “the 
unambiguous security-driven agenda that France is pursuing [in the Sahel].”318 Sahelian 
elites, mainly civil society actors, have not yet understood the core tenets of foreign 
interventions in the Sahel. 
As in every country, public opinion is crucial in security matters. Failing to 
understand this has led to protests against foreign military presence in the Sahel. In this 
regard, Yvan Guichaoua argues that “while France makes its security-driven agenda 
pretty clear, its operational moves, produced by bureaucratic thinking, are questioned by 
Sahelian publics who have a different perception of security priorities and 
sovereignty.”319 As in other Sahelian countries, the assistance of certain foreign partners 
is not perceived to be in the interest of locals due to poor communication and a poor 
relationship between civil society and foreign troops. 
Lastly, certain bilateral or multilateral programs that have been designed without 
the participation of the Nigerien security actors have often failed to meet their objectives. 
Nigerien security forces have been overstretched due to the ongoing operations and 
various training programs conducted by different partners. The training activities seem to 
be conducted mainly in Niamey area, overstretching the units in this zone, while other 
regional defense zones lack these training opportunities for their troops. Moreover, the 
content of some partner-provided training packages—conceived according to the culture 
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of these partners without taking into consideration local constraints—has been found 
inadequate to respond to the requirements of the Nigerien conditions. Hence, the lack of 
local input in these programs has seriously undermined their effectiveness. 
4. Poorly Coordinated Activities 
The coordination of activities in the Nigerien security sector has remained 
challenging. Despite an attempt to coordinate the actions of the Nigerien security forces 
through the National Crisis Management Center under the authority of the prime minister 
and unified regional command centers under regional governors, interoperability 
challenges have made these coordination bodies inefficient. There are inter-service 
organizations whose purpose has been to coordinate the efforts of different defense and 
security forces, but on the ground, interoperability does not exist. For instance, in many 
responses to terrorist attacks, ground forces have failed to effectively communicate with 
each other. This communication gap is even worse between ground troops and air support 
units. Consequently, the Nigerien security forces do not operate in close coordination. 
This situation is not surprising because the procurement of equipment for different forces 
has not anticipated the necessity of interoperability. And only a few exercises have been 
organized to strengthen the ability of these forces to operate together. Moreover, the 
absence of a fusion center that could coordinate the efforts of Nigerien intelligence 
agencies has also hindered their ability to share intelligence and the responsiveness of the 
Nigerien security forces. Furthermore, the Anti-Terrorist Center, which is under the 
Interior Ministry, is not working adequately. It lacks suitable resources to conduct its 
mission, and the Nigerien Armed Forces, which have been deeply involved in the fight 
against terrorism, do not even have a representative in this important structure as it is 
located under the Interior Ministry. 
Additionally, the efforts of the Nigerien government and its partners to strengthen 
the security sector have been poorly coordinated to date. Since 2013, the increasingly 
numerous multilateral and bilateral actors have been operating in a fragmented manner. 
Internal and external actors in the Nigerien security sector lack an umbrella under which 
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they can perform their activities in a coordinated manner for effectiveness and efficiency. 
As a result, while there are gaps in some fields, other programs have overlapped. 
Despite a clear willingness observed at the strategic level to improve the 
coordination of regional efforts to handle transnational security threats, at the lower level 
this coordination has been ineffective. For instance, the operational Joint Chief of Staff 
Committee (Comité d’État-Major Opréationnel Conjoint [CEMOC])—created in April 
2010 by Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to coordinate the efforts in fighting 
transnational security threats, and specifically tasked to improve intelligence sharing—
has failed to attend its objectives due to an evident lack of interoperability and 
coordination at tactical level.320 The incompatibility of communication equipment and 
the lack of frequent exercises among regional armed forces have hindered their capacity 
to conduct successful large-scale joint operations. 
5. Limitations of Capacity-Building Efforts 
Despite the improvement in Niger’s security forces following the reforms 
undertaken, it must be acknowledged that certain shortcomings persist, especially 
regarding the disparity between the units in terms of quality, the focus of the reforms on 
the tactical level to the detriment of the strategic level, and the attitude of certain 
elements of the FDS that tarnish the image of the entire security sector. These limitations 
constitute an obstacle to the proper use of the Nigerien security forces. 
The strengthening of the Nigerien security forces’ operational capabilities has not 
been homogenous. While the few Nigerien units that have benefited from extensive 
training and necessary equipment have clearly shown an ability to effectively fight 
terrorist groups, the majority of the defense and security units have remained 
undertrained and underequipped. Nigerien special forces and the Niger Air Force have 
developed effective units suitable for asymmetric warfare, but certain traditional units of 
the Nigerian Army, the National Gendarmerie, and the National Guard lack adequate 
preparation and equipment to deal with violent extremist groups. They have often been 
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targeted by these terrorist groups, which have effective intelligence about the Nigerien 
units.321 Additionally, the Nigerien security forces have lacked an efficient 
communication network and have not conducted large-scale training exercises that can 
improve their interoperability and their ability to effectively support each other. These 
units have thus been vulnerable to the attacks of the violent extremist organizations. 
Furthermore, the support from international partners did not meet its full 
potential. The capacity-building approach adopted by donors has often focused on the 
tactical level at the expense of institutional reform and the professionalization necessary 
to foster good governance in the security sector.322 Additionally, the overreliance on 
expensive foreign troops may not be the optimal approach. Sahelian countries can 
perform many security tasks that do not require advanced technical skills. These 
countries do not lack human power, but they do lack skilled human resources. Using 
more Western troops is costly and less effective in the long run as it will not promote the 
capacity of local forces to deal with security threats alone. For instance, Operation 
Barkhane costs about $797 million a year for an operation that uses 4,000 French 
troops.323 By comparison, the 5,000 troops of the G5 Sahel Task Force cost only $130 
million.324 The way Operation Barkhane is designed to operate in the Sahel is similar to 
NATO’s struggle in Afghanistan where the coalition has heavily relied on Western troops 
for two decades without a satisfactory solution. Carter Malkasian contends that the failure 
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of the United States and its allies to build a strong Afghan Army has facilitated the 
resurgence of Taliban insurgency.325 
Yet another shortcoming stems from an eroded relationship between the civilian 
population and the security forces. In certain areas like the Lake Chad region and the 
western region, close to Malian border, the inappropriate conduct of certain service 
members has undermined that good relationship. The lack of professionalism exhibited 
by failing to respect the rules of engagement or international humanitarian law in certain 
circumstances can harm the image of the Nigerien security forces. In both Diffa and 
Tillabery regions unlawful killings of persons suspected of being terrorists were 
reported.326 In June 2020, Human Rights Watch reported allegations of human rights 
violations by Nigerien security forces against local people.327 Reportedly, 102 civilians 
were killed in the Inates region.328 These kinds of allegations clearly undermine the 
capacity of the armed forces as they simultaneously impede the cooperation of the local 
population. Moreover, the loss of the local population’s support could further hinder the 
intelligence-gathering ability of the security forces and enhance the capacity of terrorists 
to boost their recruitment. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Nigerien security sector has demonstrated resilience in the Sahelian security 
turmoil. Nigerien security forces have enjoyed the support of the majority of the Nigerien 
citizens, the support of foreign partners, and an increasing military capability. 
Nevertheless, this apparent success of the Nigerien security sector has not been 
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comprehensive as it is only linked to a few units that have been well trained and possess 
the necessary equipment. Additionally, many weaknesses observed across the Nigerien 
security sector have undermined the prospect for long-term resilience. The poor civil-
military relations and the lack of effective oversight and control have created conditions 
for poor security governance, which has been characterized by widespread corruption and 
the mismanagement of resources. 
Consequently, the stability of the country is increasingly at risk. While the 
external threats linked to violent extremist organizations is becoming more serious, the 
Nigerien security forces aim to effectively fight them has yet to be achieved. If this trend 









V. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Building effective Nigerien security services requires an approach that takes into 
consideration the Nigerien context in a volatile Sahelian security environment, the threats 
that Niger faces, and the opportunities to fulfill the objective of preserving the country’s 
stability. This study has led to some interesting findings regarding the threats that Niger 
faces and the challenges that hinder the effective transformation of the Nigerien security 
sector. It also proposes some measures that could help alleviate the impediments to 
reforming and strengthening the Nigerien security sector.  
A. REFORMING THE NIGERIEN SECURITY SECTOR: KEY FINDINGS 
For decades, internal and external threats have threatened Niger’s stability, but the 
courageous efforts made by the Nigerien security apparatus and its partners have helped 
prevent a collapse of the country. Indeed, the threats have evolved and have become 
increasingly challenging to the stability of Niger’s security environment. The Nigerien 
security environment, dominated by Tuareg rebellions in the 1990s and 2000s, has 
become volatile since 2012 due to the rise of violent extremism in the central Sahel 
region. In response to these threats, the Nigerien security services have undergone a 
qualitative and quantitative transformation. However, some persistent shortcomings in 
the governance of the Nigerien security sector and poor civil-military relations have put 
the overall security system at risk and, thus, the stability of the country.  
1. Nigerien Security Challenges 
Despite the tremendous efforts made by Niger and its partners to ensure the 
stability of the country, the manifold security threats to Niger have been both internal and 
external. Internally, Niger has managed to contain the main security threat, the Tuareg 
insurgency. The integration of Tuareg community into the Nigerien sociopolitical and 
economic spheres has helped address certain grievances that contributed to the uprisings 
of the 1990s and the 2000s in the northern part of the country. Still, Niger’s internal 
stability remains threatened by frequent clashes between communities that have been 
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competing for scarce natural resources in the region. These frequent conflicts between 
herders and farmers, which constitute a pressing concern for the Nigerien government, 
are more likely to worsen due to the consequences of climate change and droughts that 
may continue to hamper the prospect for better life in the region. Additionally, 
ungoverned spaces in Niger continue to help create an environment conducive to illegal 
activities such as the trafficking of arms and drugs, the smuggling of immigrants, and 
kidnappings of Westerners for ransom. 
At the regional level, the crises in Libya, Nigeria, and Mali have represented a 
direct security concern for Niger, which remains under the threat of terrorist groups, 
notably Islamic State affiliates—ISGS at the Malian border and ISWAP in the Diffa 
region. In addition to the severe humanitarian crisis that these terrorist activities have 
generated in the Diffa and Tillabery regions, terrorist groups have often conducted direct 
attacks against Nigerien people and interests, causing the loss of hundreds of lives. 
Similarly, transnational criminal activities continue to grow and threaten the fragile 
stability by fueling violent extremist actions. The Libyan border also remains a 
significant concern as the chaos in southern Libya continues to make this region a hub for 
terrorists and an important supply corridor for terrorist groups. 
2. Transforming the Nigerien Security Services 
Niger’s security sector has undergone a qualitative and quantitative 
transformation since independence in 1960. The first major changes in the Nigerien 
security sector occurred during the military regime, which tried to strengthen the security 
sector. Following the recommendations of the National Conference held in 1992, Niger 
implemented some institutional reforms of the security sector in the mid-1990s. The 
second Tuareg rebellion and the rise of violent extremism in the Sahel region since the 
Libyan crisis in 2012 have compelled Nigerien authorities to engage in a vast project of 
strengthening the Nigerien security sector. The Defense Ministry and Interior Ministry 
have benefited from substantial funds from the national budget to improve the operational 
capabilities of the Nigerien defense and security forces. 
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Additionally, Niger’s partners have played an increasing role in the Nigerien 
security sector transformation through their continuous support of capacity-building and 
direct support to Nigerien security forces during their security operations. The United 
States has contributed to improve the resilience of the Nigerien security sector and their 
ability to tackle the growing security concerns. Many programs—such as the Pan Sahel 
Initiative and the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership—have helped improve the 
operational capacities of the Nigerien security sector. Similarly, periodic exercises 
(Flintlock, Unified Focus) and direct U.S. funding to support operations conducted by 
Nigerien defense and security forces have constituted indispensable assistance to the 
Nigerien security sector. Yet, the picture is not so clear regarding French and EU support 
to Niger. France, for its part, has maintained its traditional overbearing influence on the 
Nigerien security apparatus, which some people believe is negative. The European Union 
and many other European countries have shown an increasing interest to help address 
Nigerien security challenges that are seemingly linked to illegal migration to Europe. 
The results of internal and external efforts have been mixed. While these efforts in 
building Nigerien security forces have prevented a collapse of the country in a highly 
volatile Sahelian region, certain terrorist attacks against Nigerien interests constitute a 
reminder that the situation is far from under control. Certain units—namely special forces 
and ISR units and the units that have provided close air support—have shown a high 
level of combativeness during their confrontations with terrorist groups, but others have 
been incapable to appropriately deal with violent extremist attacks. The fact that security 
forces have been increasingly overstretched constitutes another concern that signals 
potential risks in the future regarding the capacity of these forces to effectively protect 
the stability of the country. 
3. Challenges to Nigerien Security Sector Transformation 
The military regime had built a relatively strong security sector, but the legacy of 
its 17-year rule heavily impacted the Nigerien sociopolitical environment. It generated 
the seeds of poor civil-military relations that have hindered the Nigerien security sector 
for decades. The successive military coups and mutinies, which Niger experienced during 
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the transition period and subsequent democratic era, eroded the fragile civil-military 
relations. The resulting lack of trust between the Nigerien executive branch and the 
military elite has impeded the efforts of building an effective security sector. 
Additionally, the Nigerien security sector has suffered from poor governance. The 
available control and oversight mechanisms have been poorly implemented, facilitating 
widespread corruption that has obliterated the efforts of Niger and its partners to build a 
coherent and effective security sector. Corruption revealed in early 2020 at the Ministry 
of Defense is a reflection of this deficiency to the security governance. 
Another factor that is becoming a major concern in the conduct of the 
counterterrorism effort is the recurrent allegations of human rights violations. In a context 
of asymmetric warfare, improper behavior by regular forces hinders the indispensable 
support of local people. At the regional level, a study conducted by UNDP in 2017 
concluded, “A striking 71 percent pointed to ‘government action,’ including ‘killing of a 
family member or friend’ or ‘arrest of a family member or friend,’ as the incident that 
prompted them to join” violent extremist groups.329 Therefore, perpetrating human rights 
violations against the people constitutes a major impediment to the entire objective of 
curbing violent extremism. In fact, human rights abuses are often instrumentalized by 
terrorists to build their propaganda and favor the recruitment of new followers among 
locals. 
Indeed, the support of regional and international partners has constituted a critical 
factor in the strengthening of the Nigerien defense and security forces, but the potential 
of this support has not been fully exploited. Certain partners have conducted programs 
without assessing the actual needs of the Nigerien security sector, leading to a waste of 
resources. Moreover, certain partners’ vision regarding the prioritization of security 
concerns has diverged from that of Niger. Thus, it has been difficult for Niger and these 
partners to pursue the same objective in a comprehensive and concerted manner. 
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Lastly, the construction of the Nigerien security sector has also suffered from a 
lack of coordination. Internally, there are some structures for coordination, but they do 
not properly function in a way to enhance security operations. Similarly, regional 
coordination structures lack appropriate standard operation procedures and effectiveness. 
The main impediment regarding coordination is the absence of a dedicated structure that 
could coordinate the activities of foreign forces in Niger. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The prospect for peace and security in Niger requires a mixture of multifaceted 
measures that can improve the ability of the Nigerien security services to effectively 
respond to the changing security challenges. The following recommendations do not call 
for large security forces dedicated to cover each square mile of the huge Nigerien 
territory; rather the objective is to generate a smarter security apparatus that possesses 
effective and highly mobile units capable of applying a targeted coercive force when and 
where needed.  
First, the promotion of strong civil-military relations is an essential element in 
building coherent defense and security institutions. The Nigerien security sector has 
suffered from the mistrust between the military and the executive branch. In order to 
restore confidence between the Nigerien executive branch and the military, the latter 
should definitively be removed from the political arena. Further, civil-military relations 
bargaining should take into consideration the absolute necessity to create a professional 
military dedicated to its missions under civilian control. The executive branch should not 
have any reason to fear its own military. Appropriate institutional control mechanisms 
should be put in place to prevent military intrusion in politics. At the same time, civilian 
control does not mean civilian autocracy over the state’s security institutions. Civilian 
authorities should serve as an example in respecting the rule of law by strictly sticking to 
their assigned role. They should not in any circumstances develop an acquaintance with 
the military hierarchy for the sole purpose of a political gain. Nevertheless, Huntington’s 
model of military professionalism cannot be strictly applied to the Nigerien security 
sector as the government’s lack of capacity requires that it use its military in various 
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tasks—tasks generally not assigned to militaries around the world—such as fighting 
organized crime, participating in infrastructural development through military engineer 
units, and providing public health support. Additionally, as Matei argues, “Security 
forces must not only be under control but must also be able to implement the assigned 
tasks at a reasonable cost.”330 The effectiveness and efficiency in conducting military 
activities are indispensable to deal with internal and external threats in a country like 
Niger that lacks sufficient resources.  
Improving civil-military relations refers not only to the relationship between the 
military and civilian authorities but also to the rapport between the military and citizens 
at the local level. Building trust between local communities and defense and security 
forces is crucial for the fulfillment of Niger’s security objectives. Nigerien defense and 
security forces need to put the protection of civilians at the heart of their operations. The 
ability of these forces to ensure the protection of the people and their rights and their 
property is an important element of the overall counterterrorism strategy. Defense and 
security forces must be, as much as possible, above reproach during counterterrorism 
operations because unlawful arrests and violence against civilians can quickly erode the 
trust built with so much effort between the military and the population. To this end, every 
unit operating in the Nigerien territory should have a prévôtale (military police) to 
enforce judicial processes and to discourage human rights abuses. These mechanisms to 
preserve a high standard of behavior are crucial for professional defense and security 
forces seeking to win the hearts and minds of the population. Conforming to professional 
norms not only strengthens the legitimacy of the Nigerien defense and security 
institutions but constitutes an indication that they are committed to the respect of the rule 
of law and aspire to maintain a good relationship with international partners. 
Second, Nigerien authorities should enhance the governance of the Nigerien 
security sector. A major impediment of the Nigerien security sector remains the lack of 
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good governance in terms of resource management and oversight, which is reflected by 
widespread corruption in the security sector and the waste of resources. As a critical 
priority, good governance is indispensable in building effective security institutions that 
are accountable and transparent. From this perspective, institutional oversight 
mechanisms should be implemented to reduce corruption and wrongdoing in the security 
sector. The fight against corruption in Niger should not only be considered an issue of 
good governance; it is a matter of survival. While the share of the Nigerien defense and 
security sector in the national budget appears to be high in percentage of GDP (more than 
2 percent), the available resources are limited (less than $250 million annually). Internal 
security actors should, thus, bear in mind the conditions that the scarcity of resources 
imposes. Each dollar should be spent with a high degree of responsibility and probity. 
While it is important to strengthen internal control of defense and security forces to 
ensure the rights of service members and civilians, the Nigerien parliament members 
should be granted the access necessary to perform oversight of the security services. 
Additionally, civil society organizations must continue improving and playing 
their critical roles in compelling the executive branch to stick to the principles of good 
governance in the security sector and improve their capacity to engage in security-related 
matters. Nigerien civil society has demonstrated a high degree of engagement to fight 
corruption at the Defense Ministry. In order to continue playing a constructive role in the 
Nigerien security sector, CSOs should improve their capacity to play their role by 
training their members in conducting investigations on security matters. Their ability to 
access non-classified security-related information can enhance accountability and 
transparency in the sense that it can improve their knowledge of Nigerien security issues 
and hence their ability to enrich the security policymaking debates. They should also 
actively participate in the creation and the implementation of new security policies for the 
benefit of the population. 
Third, Niger should design a smart defense and security forces that are capable of 
operating in the Sahel region with high effectiveness. As the pressing threat to security 
lies at the border areas, Niger should strengthen the defense capacity of the military 
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camps in these areas and utilize special forces to search and eliminate violent extremists. 
The attacks of terrorist groups have targeted traditional units that lack certain expertise 
and infrastructure necessary for the adequate defense of the camps. These units must be 
restructured and equipped in order to allow them to firmly maintain the protection of their 
camps, which can be used as logistic support points for special forces. The flexibility of 
special forces and their high mobility allow them to operate when and where they are 
needed. To ensure that each unit will play its role, a committee should be tasked to 
examine the structure, equipment, and training needs of the Nigerien security services, 
which should be reorganized according to the security requirements. 
Niger should also continue to adapt its strategy in order respond to the threat as it 
evolves. For this purpose, CNSS should continue elaborating comprehensive joint 
doctrines for defense and security forces in order to enhance joint operational 
effectiveness. 
Fourth, foreign support remains indispensable for Niger to address current 
security challenges, but Niger and its partners should create an assistance model in which 
this support will gradually decrease Nigerien dependence on external support. The 
objective of the aid should be to improve the overall security sector in a manner that 
Nigerien security structures could handle security-related issues with more autonomy in 
the long run. In the same vein, because using Western troops is costly, it is recommended 
that Niger’s security forces operate with Sahelian troops to reduce overall security 
expenditures and promote the emergence of strong regional defense and security forces. 
Western troops should only be used in the areas where Sahelian troops lack necessary 
skills. Priority should be given to training and equipping local security forces as well as 
providing limited advisers on ground to support these local forces. By doing so, more 
resources can be made available to local defense and security forces and, thus, the overall 
security system would be more sustainable in the long run.  
Fifth, the activities in the Nigerien security sector should be coordinated at 
national and regional levels. Internally, Nigerien policymakers must create conditions 
that favor the proper functioning of the existing coordinating bodies and establish an 
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inter-ministerial body under the prime minister’s office that can coordinate all security-
related matters. Moreover, Niger should create a unified anti-terrorist command structure 
that will be in charge of all counterterrorism operations. The armed forces, which are in 
charge of defense-related tasks, have been performing interior security responsibilities 
due to the increasing power of non-state actors. Therefore, as armed forces and security 
forces are operating in the same environment, it is necessary to coordinate their actions. 
Furthermore, Niger must establish a mechanism to coordinate the activities 
carried out by its partners in the fight against terrorism and irregular immigration. The 
body that will implement this mechanism should be comprised of the representatives, the 
Ministry of Defense, the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Transport, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and Cooperation and any 
other key actor. Effective coordination of the security efforts of the external donors and 
the internal actors is indispensable to meet the objectives of building an effective security 
sector capable of tackling the rising violent extremist threat. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It is important for Niger to build security institutions that are effective, 
accountable, transparent, and under democratic, civilian control. These institutions should 
conform to the principles of good governance and must operate with strict respect for 
human rights as well as the rule of law. The shortcomings in governance of the Nigerien 
security sector identified in this thesis should be taken into consideration to improve 
civil-military relations and create conditions for the emergence of professional and 
effective defense and security forces. Strong civil-military relations based on democratic 
norms should be the cornerstone of the development of a robust and effective security 
sector. To this end, the democratic, civilian control of the Nigerien defense and security 
forces should be organized according the following attributes identified by Halladay and 
Matei: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, the inculcation of professional norms, 
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and efficiency.331 The construction of an effective and efficient security sector is the 
foundation for Niger’s long-term stability. 
                                                 
331 Florina Cristiana Matei and Carolyn Halladay, “The Control-Effectiveness Framework of Civil-
Military Relations” (forthcoming). 
111 
 
APPENDIX: TRANSFERS OF MAJOR WEAPONS 
Table 3. Deals with deliveries or orders made for 1960 to 2019332 
 
Note: The ‘No. delivered’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning 
of the contract. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. 
Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the 





                                                 
332 Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (Trade Registers; accessed on August 17), 2020, 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php 
  
      Year(s)   
Supplier/  No. Weapon Weapon Year of No.   
 recipient (R) ordered designation description of order delivery delivered Comments  
China 
R: Niger (5) ZFB-05 APC (2007) 2009 (5)  
       (2) WZ-523 APC (2008) 2009 (2)  
       (20) Tiger APV (2017) 2017 (20) Designation uncertain (reported as 'armoured 
combat vehicle')  
France 
R: Niger 8 M-20 Reconnaissance AV (1958) 1960 (8) Second-hand 
       (8) M-8 Greyhound Armoured car (1958) 1960 (8) Second-hand 
       1 DC-3/C-47 Skytrain Transport aircraft (1960) 1961 1 Second-hand; aid 
       4 MH-1521 Broussard Light aircraft (1963) 1964 4 Probably second-hand; aid 
       1 DC-3/C-47 Skytrain Transport aircraft (1964) 1965 1 Second-hand 
       1 MD-315 Flamant Light transport ac (1964) 1965 1 Probably second-hand; aid 
       2 DC-3/C-47 Skytrain Transport aircraft (1969) 1969 2 Second-hand 
       2 Cessna-337/O-2 Light aircraft (1970) 1971 2  
       1 DC-4/C-54 Transport aircraft 1974 1974 1 Second-hand; aid 
       (22) M-3 VTT APC (1979) 1980 (22)  
       1 Noratlas Transport aircraft 1979 1980 1 Second-hand 
       (4) MO-120-RT 120mm Mortar (1980) 1980 (4)  
       (36) AML-60/90 Armoured car 1981 1983 (36) AML-60 and AML-90 versions 
       (7) M-3 VDA SPAAG 1981 1982 (7)  
       (3) M-3 VDA SPAAG 1981 1982 (3)  
       (7) VBL APV 1986 1986 (7) No. could between 3 and 9 
       (20) AML-60/90 Armoured car (1990) 1991 (20) Possibly second-hand; AML-60 and AML-90 
versions 
       (8) Tétras Light aircraft (2009) 2010-2014 (8) Aid 
       3 SA-342 Gazelle Light helicopter 2012 2013 3 Second-hand but modernized before delivery; 
armed SA-342L-1 version; part of CFA270 m 
($77 m) aid 
       4 VAB-VTT APC 2015 2015 4 Second-hand; aid 
       13 Bastion APC/APV 2019 2019 13 Aid financed by EU 
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R: Niger 1 Commander Light transport ac (1970) 1970 1  
       4 Noratlas Transport aircraft (1970) 1971 4 Second-hand 
       (3) Do-28D Skyservant Light transport ac (1978) 1978-1979 (3)  
       20 UR-416 APC 1984 1984 20  
       1 Do-228 Light transport ac 1985 1986 1   
 
Libya 
R: Niger 1 An-26 Transport aircraft 1997 1997 1 Second-hand; aid  
 
South Africa 
R: Niger (6) Mamba APC (2013) 2014 (6) Mamba-7 version 
       (15) Puma M-26 APC (2013) 2014 (15)   
 
Ukraine 
R: Niger 2 Su-25 Ground attack ac 2012 2013 2 Second-hand  
 
United States 
R: Niger 1 Cessna-337/O-2 Light aircraft (1969) 1969 1  
       2 C-130H Hercules Transport aircraft 1979 1979 2  
       2 Cessna-208 Caravan Light transport ac (2013) 2013 2 Part of $11 m aid; Cessna-208B version 
       1 King Air-350 ISR AGS aircraft (2013) 2015 1 Second-hand King Air-350 probably modernized 
and modified to AGS aircraft before delivery  
       2 Cessna-208 Caravan Light transport ac 2014 2015 2 Cessna-208B surveillance version 
       (1) C-130H Hercules Transport aircraft (2015)   Second-hand; aid; delivery planned 2020 
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